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A JURISDICTIONAL SKIRMISH IN THE ARKANSAS APPELLATE 
COURTS: RULE 37 POST-CONVICTION APPEALS AND THE 
IMPORTANCE OF SUPREME COURT RULE 1-2(H) 
J. Thomas Sullivan* 
“We assumed jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to footnote 1 in 
Barnes v. State, 2017 Ark. 76, 511 S.W.3d 845 (per curiam).” 
 
Slater v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 499, *1, 583 S.W.3d 84, 86 
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE BARNES FOOTNOTE 
Effective March 2, 2017, the Arkansas Court of Appeals will assume ap-
pellate jurisdiction of all appeals arising from a petitioner’s allegation 
that the petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial or on 
direct appeal from a judgment of conviction except in instances when the 
death penalty or life imprisonment has been imposed on the petitioner. 
The Arkansas Court of Appeals will also assume jurisdiction of petitions 
for post-conviction relief pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 37.1 in cases wherein the Rule required the petitioner in cases 
where the judgment was entered before July 1, 1989, to obtain permis-
sion from the appellate court before proceeding in the trial court with a 
petition under the Rule.
1
 
In an otherwise unremarkable published opinion, Barnes v. State,2 the 
Arkansas Supreme Court summarily changed the appellate process in the 
state’s postconviction process that may afford relief in some criminal cases.3 
It directed that appeals in actions involving postconviction attacks on con-
victions or sentences pursuant to Arkansas Rule Criminal Procedure 37.14 
based on claims of ineffective assistance rendered by defense counsel will 
be heard in the future by the Arkansas Court of Appeals,5 rather than the 
 
 1. Barnes v. State, 2017 Ark. 76, at 1 n.1, 511 S.W.3d 845, 846 n.1. The court issued 
the opinion in Barnes on March 2, 2017. 
 2. 2017 Ark. 76, 511 S.W.3d 845. 
 3. See In re Review of Habeas Corpus Proceedings, 313 Ark. 168, 852 S.W.2d 791 
(1993), where the state supreme court clarified its position on review of habeas corpus ac-
tions, announcing that following its decision, review would be by appeal, rather than by peti-
tion for writ of certiorari, addressing conflicting decisions previously rendered by the court. 
Certain specific challenges, such as denial of reasonable bail, continue to be brought by certi-
orari. Thomas v. State, 260 Ark. 512, 542 S.W.2d 284 (1976). 
 4. An Arkansas defendant challenging the legality of the sentence imposed, or by im-
plication, the underlying conviction, “may file a petition in the court that imposed the sen-
tence, praying that the sentence be vacated or corrected.” ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.1(a). Arkansas 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1(a) provides: 
(a) A petitioner in custody under sentence of a circuit court claiming a right to be 
released, or to have a new trial, or to have the original sentence modified on the 
ground: 
(i) that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution and laws of the 
United States or this state; or 
(ii) that the court imposing the sentence was without jurisdiction to do so; or 
(iii) that the sentence was in excess of the maximum sentence authorized by law; 
or 
(iv) that the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack; may file a petition 
in the court that imposed the sentence, praying that the sentence be vacated or 
corrected. 
 5. For a brief history of the Arkansas Court of Appeals, see Court of Appeals, ARK. 
JUDICIARY, https://www.arcourts.gov/courts/court-of-appeals (last visited Sept. 6, 2017); see 
also Josephine Linker Hart & Guilford M. Dudley, The Unpublished Rules of the Arkansas 
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state supreme court, except in cases in which a death sentence or sentence of 
life imprisonment was imposed at trial.6 In this single footnote, the state 
supreme court redirected substantial responsibility for appellate review of 
cases rooted in the criminal trial process and did so leaving the precise pa-
rameters of the realignment of appellate jurisdiction vague. The change in 
appellate jurisdiction has significant consequences for Arkansas litigants 
and implicates an unresolved constitutional issue regarding the independent 
authority of the states to tailor their discrete appellate systems within the 
federalized judicial system.7 
In Barnes, the trial court of conviction dismissed the action based on 
the petitioner’s failure to comply with the requirement for personal verifica-
tion of the petition’s contents. The verification requirement, an express re-
quirement under the rules, is explained as necessary to prevent falsification 
of claims by inmates8 filing pro se.9 
 
Court of Appeals: The Internal Rules and Procedures of the Arkansas Court of Appeals, 33 
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 109 (2011). Justice Hart now sits on the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas. Associate Justice Josephine L. Hart, Position 4, ARK. JUDICIARY, 
https://www.arcourts.gov/courts/supreme-court/justices/associate-justice-josephine-l-hart-
position-4 (last visited Apr. 14, 2019). 
 6. Barnes, 2017 Ark. 76, at 1 n.1, 511 S.W.3d at 846. The reservation of initial appel-
late jurisdiction over Rule 37.1 appeals in which a sentence of life imprisonment was im-
posed at trial by the supreme court is consistent with its jurisdiction on the direct appeal. See 
ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(a) (“All cases appealed shall be filed in the Court of Appeals except that 
the following cases shall be filed in the Supreme Court: . . . 2. Criminal appeals in which the 
death penalty or life imprisonment has been imposed.”). Because the supreme court has juris-
diction over cases in which a life sentence is imposed, it has jurisdiction over subsequent 
appeals in cases arising from the same prosecution under Rule 1-2(a)7. 
 7. In the context of the criminal process, the nation works under a federalized judicial 
system because both federal and state courts have jurisdiction over criminal matters as a 
result of the operation of federal and state criminal statutes, sometimes regulating the same 
conduct. E.g., Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 857-60 (2014) (discussing propriety of 
apparent overlap of state offenses and federal criminal offenses grounded in regulation of 
interstate commerce). In the postconviction context, the federalized judicial system is reflect-
ed in the review afforded state court determinations on claimed violations of procedural 
rights protected under the federal constitution by the Supreme Court of the United States in 
the certiorari process, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), and in the federal habe-
as corpus process, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2018). In Long, the Court observed: 
The state courts handle the vast bulk of all criminal litigation in this country. In 
1982, more than twelve million criminal actions (excluding juvenile and traffic 
charges) were filed in the 50 state court systems and the District of Columbia. By 
comparison, approximately 32,700 criminal suits were filed in federal courts dur-
ing that same year. The state courts are required to apply federal constitutional 
standards, and they necessarily create a considerable body of “federal law” in the 
process. 
Long, 463 U.S. at 1042 n.8 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 8. The reference to “inmates” is intentional. An individual in custody as a consequence 
of a felony conviction has standing to bring an action for postconviction relief pursuant to 
Rule 37. But, postconviction relief under Rule 37 is not available to a convicted defendant 
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On appeal, the supreme court upheld the circuit court’s dismissal of the 
Rule 37.1 petition, dismissing Barnes’s appeal.10 The dismissal in the trial 
court resulted from the defendant’s attempt to withdraw his plea, by motion, 
following his conviction on a guilty plea to four felonies with his punish-
ment set at 240 months imprisonment.11 The trial court construed the post-
trial motion to “retract” the guilty plea12 as a Rule 37.1 petition,13 and the 
 
unless the petitioner is actually in custody at the time of filing the petition. Scott v. State, No. 
CR 05-351, 2006 WL 302351, at *1 (Ark. Feb. 9, 2006); Bohannon v. State, 336 Ark. 367, 
372, 985 S.W.2d 708, 710 (1999). The Arkansas Supreme Court has consistently held that in 
order to pursue relief pursuant to Rule 37.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure—
the primary route for collateral attack on a conviction under Arkansas law—the petitioner 
must be incarcerated at the time of filing the petition. Scott, 2006 WL 302351, at *2; Bohan-
non, 336 Ark. at 372, 985 S.W.2d at 710. The state court has expressly rejected reliance on 
the more expansive understanding and treatment of the “in custody” requirement applied by 
federal courts in postconviction proceedings. Bohannon, 336 Ark. at 372, 985 S.W.2d at 710 
(parolee not “in custody” for purposes of postconviction litigation under Rule 37); Kemp v. 
State, 330 Ark. 757, 758, 956 S.W.2d 860, 861 (1997) (holding that a defendant sentenced 
only to pay fine is not eligible for postconviction relief). 
 9. E.g., Nelson v. State, 363 Ark. 306, 306, 213 S.W.3d 645, 646 (2005); Boyle v. 
State, 362 Ark. 248, 250–51, 208 S.W.3d 134, 136 (2005). The verification requirement has 
also been applied to dismiss petitions filed by counsel representing inmates on behalf of a 
petitioner. In Walker v. Norris, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the district 
court’s deference to state court dismissal of the petitioner’s unverified Rule 37 petition, de-
spite evidence that it had applied this remedy inconsistently in appeals from Rule 37 dismis-
sals. 436 F.3d 1026, 1031–33 (8th Cir. 2006). The petitioner’s attorney had signed the peti-
tion, rather than the petitioner personally executing a separate verification. Id. at 1032. The 
Eighth Circuit found that the state postconviction petition was not properly filed as a conse-
quence and did not toll the time for filing the federal petition, and therefore the petition was 
dismissed as not timely filed. Id. at 1032–33. Thus, verification remains a critical technical 
requirement for the consideration of the petitioner’s postconviction claims for relief. In 
Wooten v. State, however, the court applied an exception to the mandatory requirement that 
the petitioner verify the petition personally in cases in which a death sentence had been im-
posed, permitting correction of the error without dismissal of the Rule 37.5 petition. 2010 
Ark. 467, 370 S.W.3d 475. 
 10. Barnes, 2017 Ark. 76, at 2, 511 S.W.3d at 846. The court explained its rationale for 
dismissing the appeal from the circuit court’s dismissal of the pending postconviction action: 
We dismiss the appeal because it is evident from the record that Barnes could not succeed on 
appeal. This court will not permit an appeal from an order that denied a petition for postcon-
viction relief to go forward where it is clear that the appellant could not prevail. The motions 
are rendered moot by the dismissal of the appeal. 
Id. at 2, 511 S.W.3d at 846 (citation omitted). 
 11. Id. at 1, 511 S.W.3d at 845. The defendant styled his motion as one to “retract” his 
guilty plea, perhaps attempting to circumvent Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.1(a), 
which provides that once a judgment is entered on the record of the conviction, the trial court 
loses jurisdiction to entertain a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. 
 12. A defendant convicted upon a guilty plea may move to withdraw the plea under 
certain circumstances, including an allegation that counsel provided ineffective assistance if 
necessary to correct a “manifest injustice.” ARK. R. CRIM. P. 26.1(b)(1). 
 13. With respect to ineffective assistance claims challenging counsel’s representation in 
advising the defendant who pleads guilty, the Arkansas Supreme Court has held “[i]t must be 
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state supreme court upheld the trial court’s disposition under its prior deci-
sions.14 
II. THE SKIRMISH 
Quite apart from the per curiam disposition of the appeal in Barnes, the 
supreme court chose to announce the change in appellate jurisdiction in a 
footnote to the Barnes opinion. The court’s language could be misleading 
because the change in jurisdiction appears limited to appeals involving 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, rather than in referencing all 
appeals from Rule 37.1 actions.15 The respective jurisdictional limits of the 
state supreme court and court of appeals are set out in the Arkansas Rules of 
the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Rule 1-2,16 as adopted by the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court. With the creation of the Arkansas Court of Appeals 
by constitutional amendment in 1979, the supreme court was given authority 
to determine jurisdiction of the respective appellate courts: 
The General Assembly is hereby empowered to create and establish a 
Court of Appeals and divisions thereof. The Court of Appeals shall have 
 
remembered that on appeal from the denial of a Rule 37 petition following pleas of guilty 
there are only two issues for review—one, whether the plea of guilty was intelligently and 
voluntarily entered, two, were the pleas made on the advice of competent counsel.” Branham 
v. State, 292 Ark. 355, 357, 730 S.W.2d 226, 227 (1987); see also Bryant v. State, 323 Ark. 
130, 131–32, 913 S.W.2d 257, 258 (1996). 
 14. Barnes, 2017 Ark. 76, at 2, 511 S.W.3d at 845 (citing Bailey v. State, 312 Ark. 180, 
182, 848 S.W.2d 391, 392 (1993) (per curiam); Millsap v. Kelley, 2016 Ark. 406, at 2, 2016 
WL 6803694, at *2 (per curiam)). 
 15. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.1–37.4 (providing for the basic postconviction remedy in Ar-
kansas criminal prosecutions). 
 16. Rule 1-2 of the rules regarding jurisdiction of the Arkansas appellate courts, adopted 
by the state supreme court provides: 
(a) Supreme Court Jurisdiction. All cases appealed shall be filed in the Court of 
Appeals except that the following cases shall be filed in the Supreme Court: 
1. All appeals involving the interpretation or construction of the Constitution of 
Arkansas; 
2. Criminal appeals in which the death penalty or life imprisonment has been im-
posed; 
3. Petitions for quo warranto, prohibition, injunction, or mandamus directed to 
the state, county, or municipal officials or to circuit courts; 
4. Appeals pertaining to elections and election procedures; 
5. Appeals involving the discipline of attorneys-at-law and or arising under the 
power of the Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law; 
6. Appeals involving the discipline and disability of judges; 
7. Second or subsequent appeals following an appeal which has been decided in 
the Supreme Court; and 
8. Appeals required by law to be heard by the Supreme Court. 
ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2. 
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such appellate jurisdiction as the Supreme Court shall by rule determine, 
and shall be subject to the general superintending control of the Supreme 
Court.
17
 
Rule 1-2 has not expressly addressed initial jurisdiction over appeals in ac-
tions brought under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1.18 
Although Rule 1-2 has not explicitly provided that appeals from trial 
court determinations on the merits of claims brought pursuant to Rule 37.1 
lie within the jurisdiction of the Arkansas Supreme Court, these appeals 
have traditionally been filed in that court.19 Rule 37.3 of the criminal proce-
dure rules does expressly provide, however, that when counsel is appointed 
to represent a petitioner in a Rule 37.1 action, the appeal lies with the state 
supreme court.20 The Barnes footnote has effectively abrogated this provi-
sion in the rule. 
The Arkansas Court of Appeals responded to the supreme court’s reas-
signment of jurisdiction in Barnes with its opinion in Bridgeman v. State,21 
an appeal from denial of postconviction relief in a Rule 37.1 action. There, 
the court noted, “Before we can address the specific arguments that Bridge-
man raises on appeal, we must first address how our court obtained jurisdic-
tion over appeals such as this, which have historically been decided by our 
supreme court.”22 
The court’s opinion, written by Judge Whiteaker,23 recalled the tradi-
tional history of jurisdiction over Rule 37 actions.24 He noted in this instruc-
 
 17. ARK. CONST. amend. 58, repealed by ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 22(D) (emphasis 
added) (legislatively establishing the court of appeals, effective from July 1, 1979 until July 
1, 2001 with Amendment 80); see Act of Feb. 23, 1979, No. 208, 1979 Ark. Acts 467. The 
amendment was adopted by the voters at the November 7, 1978 election. 
 18. See ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.1–37.4. 
 19. See, e.g., Henington v. State, 2012 Ark. 181, at 1, 303 S.W.3d 55, 57 (“We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 37 and Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1-2(a)(8) (2011).”). The 
opinion makes no reference to any jurisdictional statement included in Rule 1-2(a)(8) which 
would dictate that an appeal from denial of postconviction relief in a Rule 37.1 action lies 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the supreme court. 
 20. Rule 37.3(b) provides, in pertinent part: 
If a petition on which the petitioner was represented by counsel is denied, counsel shall con-
tinue to represent the petitioner for an appeal to the Supreme Court, unless relieved as coun-
sel by the circuit court or the Supreme Court. If no hearing was held or the petitioner pro-
ceeded pro se at the hearing, the circuit court may at its discretion appoint counsel for an 
appeal upon proper motion by the petitioner. 
ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.3(b). 
 21. 2017 Ark. App. 321, 525 S.W.3d 459. 
 22. Id. at 1, 525 S.W.3d at 460. 
 23. Id., 525 S.W.3d at 460. The decision was issued by two panels of the court of ap-
peals, with Chief Justice Gruber and Justices Gladwin, Klappenbach, Vaught, and Brown, 
agreeing with Justice Whiteaker. Id. at 10, 525 S.W.3d at 465. 
 24. Id. at 2, 525 S.W.3d at 461. 
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tional discussion that the state supreme court had consistently held, prior to 
its decision in Barnes, that review of appeals from denial of postconviction 
were “required by law to be heard by the Supreme Court.”25 He referred to 
the supreme court’s 2014 decision, Green v. State,26 in which the court noted 
that the appellant brought an appeal from denial of postconviction relief to 
the supreme court based on Rule 37 and Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1-
2(a)(8),27 which merely provide that the court has jurisdiction over 
“[a]ppeals required by law to be heard by the Supreme Court.”28 
The Bridgeman court then observed: 
On March 2, 2017, however, our supreme court, without effectuating a 
rule change and without any explication or further explanation as to why 
it was no longer required by law to hear such cases, summarily trans-
ferred a majority of its Rule 37 cases to this court by means of a footnote 
in an unsigned per curiam opinion. Thus, we exercise jurisdiction over 
this appeal pursuant to the authority apparently delegated to us by virtue 
of this simple footnote contained in Barnes.
29
 
The court then proceeded to address the question presented by the appeal on 
the merits, rejecting his claim that his guilty plea was not knowingly entered 
because trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to fully advise 
him of the sentencing consequences of the plea.30 This claim in the Rule 37 
petition clearly fell within the supreme court’s footnote directive in Barnes, 
because it addressed trial counsel’s effectiveness in advising his client with 
respect to the guilty plea, as noted in the footnote reassigning appellate ju-
risdiction to the court of appeals.31 
However, Bridgeman asserted an alternative theory that was not specif-
ically couched in terms of counsel’s performance. He argued that because 
the judgment initially entered in the case did not indicate that he was being 
sentenced as a habitual offender, the 15-year sentence imposed on his con-
 
 25. Id., 525 S.W.3d at 461 (emphasis added). 
 26. 2014 Ark. 284, 2014 WL 2814866. 
 27. Id. at 1, 2014 WL 2814866, at *1. 
 28. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(a)(8). 
 29. Bridgeman, 2017 Ark. App. 321, at 3–4, 525 S.W.3d at 462 (emphasis added) (citing 
Barnes v. State, 2017 Ark. 76, at 1 n.1, 511 S.W.3d 845, 846 n.1). The Bridgeman court 
observed, “Prior to March 2, 2017, the Arkansas Supreme Court exerted jurisdiction over all 
postconviction matters, as it had previously and consistently held that such appeals are ‘re-
quired by law to be heard by the Supreme Court’ pursuant to Rule 1-2(a)(8).” Id. at 2, 525 
S.W.3d at 462 (emphasis in original) (quoting ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2 (a)(8)) (citing multiple 
decisions of Arkansas Supreme Court). 
 30. Id. at 5–7, 525 S.W.3d at 462–63. 
 31. Barnes, 2017 Ark. 76, at 1 n.1, 511 S.W.3d at 846 n.1. Ineffective assistance of 
counsel is commonly brought as a violation of the Sixth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and litigated pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See 
discussion of Strickland infra notes 158–59 and accompanying text. 
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viction—10 years imprisonment with an additional 5 years suspend-
edexceeded the trial court’s authority since he was convicted of a Class D 
felony offense, carrying a sentence range of 0-6 years,32 on a reduced charge 
of breaking and entering.33 The imposition of a sentence in excess of the trial 
court’s authority under the applicable sentencing statute constitutes jurisdic-
tional error,34 which may be challenged initially on direct appeal35 or in 
postconviction without having been preserved by objection at trial.36 
The postconviction court ruled, however, that Bridgeman had made a 
knowing and voluntary plea of guilty pursuant to an agreement negotiated 
by trial counsel and represented his understanding of the plea agreement to 
the court during his guilty plea colloquy.37 The court of appeals rejected 
Bridgeman’s argument on appeal based on the trial court’s findings, includ-
ing his admission that he was satisfied with counsel’s performance when he 
entered his guilty plea.38 
In light of the record, it is not at all remarkable that Bridgman’s post-
conviction challenges were rejected by both the trial and appellate courts. 
But, there is one additional point particularly relevant in light of the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court’s reassignment of appellate jurisdiction for Rule 37 ap-
peals. In the Barnes footnote, the court expressly held that the court of ap-
peals would thereafter have jurisdiction over appeals of postconviction 
claims “arising from a petitioner’s allegation that the petitioner was denied 
effective assistance of counsel at trial or on direct appeal from a judgment 
of conviction.”39 The supreme court did not simply redirect all appeals from 
denial of Rule 37.1 relief to the court of appeals, although that is almost 
certainly the court’s intent. Rather, the express language in the Barnes foot-
note only redirects appeals based on ineffective assistance of counsel at trial 
or on direct appeal to the court of appeals.40 
 
 32. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-401(a)(5) (West 2019). 
 33. Bridgeman, 2017 Ark. App. 321, at 4–5, 525 S.W.3d at 462. 
 34. Flowers v. Norris, 347 Ark. 760, 765, 68 S.W.3d 289, 292 (2002). 
 35. Donaldson v. State, 370 Ark. 3, 5–6, 257 S.W.3d 74, 76 (2007); Thomas v. State, 
349 Ark. 447, 459, 79 S.W.3d 347, 354 (2002). 
 36. Renshaw v. State, 337 Ark. 494, 498, 989 S.W.2d 515, 517–18 (1999). 
 37. Bridgeman, 2017 Ark. App. 321, at 6–7, 525 S.W.3d at 463. 
 38. Id. at 8, 525 S.W.3d at 464. 
 39. Barnes v. State, 2017 Ark. 76, at 1 n.1, 511 S.W.3d 845, 846 n.1 (emphasis added). 
 40. The court of appeals specifically noted that the supreme court had “summarily trans-
ferred a majority of its Rule 37 cases to this court by means of a footnote in an unsigned per 
curiam opinion.” Bridgeman, 2017 Ark. App. 321, at 3–4, 525 S.W.3d at 462. However, in a 
post-Barnes opinion, the court of appeals reversed the trial court in a Rule 37.1 appeal in 
Kauffeld v. State, to correct a clerical error in the judgment in considering the petitioner’s 
claimed violation of the protection afforded by double jeopardy. 2019 Ark. App. 29, at 4, 569 
S.W.3d 348, 352. 
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Bridgeman did challenge trial counsel’s effectiveness,41 but his other 
point in challenging his sentence was directed at the trial court’s exercise of 
jurisdiction in imposing the sentence that had been agreed upon in the nego-
tiated plea. Because the judgment entered by the court did not include the 
recitation, or checked box, indicating the he was being sentenced as a habit-
ual offender, he argued that the 15-year sentence, with 5 years suspended, 
amounted to a sentence in violation of the trial court’s authority.42 This 
claim did not constitute an attack on trial counsel’s performance, or effec-
tiveness, at all. The court of appeals, however, had no difficulty in finding 
that the trial court’s correction of the clerical error in the omission of the 
reference to his punishment as a habitual offender by amending the judg-
ment and commitment order nunc pro tunc was proper.43 The record of the 
plea colloquy effectively rebutted any claimed prejudice from the clerical 
error and reflected Bridgeman’s understanding of the plea agreement and his 
willingness to forego trial and plead guilty.44 
Ultimately, of course, the Arkansas Supreme Court would necessarily 
prevail in the skirmish over jurisdiction of Rule 37.1 appeals. As the 
Bridgeman court explained, the power to define appellate jurisdiction had 
consistently been vested in the Arkansas Supreme Court by the state consti-
tution with approval for creation of the Arkansas Court of Appeals by 
amendment in 1978.45 Amendment 80 section 5 of the Arkansas Constitu-
tion, adopted pursuant to the 2000 General Election, affirmed the authority 
of the supreme court to define the jurisdiction of the court of appeals, ex-
pressly providing: 
There shall be a Court of Appeals which may have divisions thereof as 
established by Supreme Court rule. The Court of Appeals shall have such 
appellate jurisdiction as the Supreme Court shall by rule determine and 
shall be subject to the general superintending control of the Supreme 
 
 41. Bridgeman, 2017 Ark. App. 321, at 8–9, 525 S.W.3d at 464. 
 42. Id. at 5, 525 S.W.3d at 462–63 (“On appeal, Bridgeman challenges the trial court’s 
factual findings, argues that his attorney was ineffective for not sufficiently informing him of 
the sentencing consequences of his suspended sentence, and asserts that he was convicted of 
a crime for which he was never charged.”). 
 43. Id. at 7, 525 S.W.3d at 463. 
 44. Id. at 6–7, 525 S.W.3d at 463–64. 
 45. Id. at 1–2 n.1, 525 S.W.3d at 460–61 n.1. In note 1, the court explained: 
Amendment 58, which was approved by voters on November 7, 1978, stated, in 
relevant part, “The General Assembly is hereby empowered to create and estab-
lish a Court of Appeals and divisions thereof. The Court of Appeals shall have 
such appellate jurisdiction as the Supreme Court shall by rule determine, and 
shall be subject to the general superintending control of the Supreme Court.” 
Id., 525 S.W.3d at 460–61 n.1 (emphasis in original) (quoting ARK. CONST. amend. 58, re-
pealed by ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 22(D)). 
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Court. Judges of the Court of Appeals shall have the same qualifications 
as Justices of the Supreme Court.
46
 
The recognition by the Bridgeman court of the change in appellate ju-
risdiction to redirect appeals in Rule 37 postconviction actions in which 
ineffective assistance of counsel is alleged, effectively would have ended the 
skirmish over the reassignment occasioned by the supreme court’s footnote 
in Barnes. However, just over one month later, perhaps stung by Judge 
Whiteaker’s criticism of the manner by which the supreme court had altered 
appellate jurisdiction over Rule 37.1 appeals, Associate Justice Womack 
issued a reply for the majority in an opinion on a wholly unrelated matter in 
Mason v. Mason.47 
Mason involved the certification of an issue on appeal by the Arkansas 
Court of Appeals to the Arkansas Supreme Court.48 The issue concerned 
retroactive application of a statute requiring mandatory termination of ali-
mony payments upon a showing that the alimony recipient is “living full 
time with another person in an intimate, cohabitating relationship.”49 The 
supreme court rejected retroactive application of this provision to an award 
of alimony included in a divorce decree issued in 2010,50 remanding the case 
for determination of other appellate issues not before the supreme court in 
the certified question.51 
 
 46. ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 5 (emphasis added) (approved by the voters in the No-
vember 7, 2000 election). 
 47. 2017 Ark. 225, 522 S.W.3d 123. The opinion was not unanimous as Chief Justice 
Kemp dissented. Id. at 5, 522 S.W.3d at 126. 
 48. Id. at 1, 522 S.W.3d at 124; see also ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(d). The rule provides for 
transfer of a pending case from the court of appeals to the supreme court, in pertinent part: 
If the Court of Appeals seeks to transfer a case, the Court of Appeals shall find 
and certify that the case: (1) is excepted from its jurisdiction by Rule 1-2(a), or 
(2) otherwise involves an issue of significant public interest or a legal principle 
of major importance. The Supreme Court may accept for its docket cases so cer-
tified or may remand any of them to the Court of Appeals for decision. 
ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(d). 
 49. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-312(a)(2)(D) (West 2019). 
 50. Mason, 2017 Ark. 225, at 2, 522 S.W.3d at 124. Resolution of the retroactivity issue 
represented an important ruling under state law, both because it clarified the finality of ali-
mony orders in divorce decrees entered prior to the effective date of the statute, and because 
it affords insight into the court’s current review of retroactive application of legislation with 
respect to civil law issues. Id. at 1, 522 S.W.3d at 124. Initially, the court explained that ret-
roactive application of new legislation is subject to a clear expression of legislative intent. Id. 
at 4, 522 S.W.3d at 125. The majority found that because there was no evidence in the statu-
tory language, neither party arguing to the contrary, there was no basis for concluding that the 
General Assembly intended retroactive application of the new provision mandating end of 
alimony in the event the recipient subsequently engages in an intimate, cohabitating relation-
ship. Id. at 3–5, 522 S.W.3d at 125–26. The legislation incorrectly said “cohabitating,” rather 
than using the correct term, cohabiting. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-312(a)(2)(D). 
 51. Mason, 2017 Ark. 225, at 2, 522 S.W.3d at 124. 
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Mason also includes another point, unrelated to disposition of the ret-
roactivity issue. Again, in a footnote, the majority directly criticized the Ar-
kansas Court of Appeals, complaining of the state of the record on appeal 
that the intermediate court forwarded with its certification request.52 The 
opinion, this time in a signed opinion, included the supreme court’s refer-
ence to the inadequate briefs submitted by counsel for the parties, including 
the brief submitted on behalf of the appellant, who nevertheless prevailed on 
the certified question.53 The supreme court criticized the briefs: 
We note that the briefs the court of appeals certified to us are deficient. 
The appellee raised his statutory argument in a motion for summary 
judgment. Debra filed a response and Charles filed an additional reply. 
The circuit court held a hearing on May 5, 2014, and issued an order on 
June 17, 2014, denying the appellee’s motion for summary judgment. 
None of the mentioned pleadings, hearings, orders, or briefs and exhibits 
are included in the abstract or addendum.
54
 
But the court’s opinion does not simply address the deficiencies in the 
briefs submitted by counsel for the respective parties. First, the court ex-
plained that it was able to resolve the retroactivity issue without resorting to 
the materials not included in the briefs as submitted.55 The supreme court 
went further in directing its criticism to the court of appeals: 
We remand to the court of appeals to address the briefing deficiencies 
and the underlying merits of the case. It is unfortunate that this case was 
certified to our court in its current state. We note that with twelve judges, 
twenty-four law clerks, and four staff attorneys, the court of appeals has 
sufficient resources to spot such deficiencies. In the future, we expect the 
court of appeals to ensure that the briefs comply with our rules prior to 
certifying a case to this court.
56
 
The court’s comment might not be interpreted as a response to the Bridge-
man court’s observations on the reassignment of appellate jurisdiction in 
Rule 37.1 appeals to that court. But then again, it would not seem unlikely 
that the reader or court observer would characterize it as nothing less than a 
direct response reflecting a near-consensus that the intermediate court had 
improperly questioned the means by which the reassignment had been an-
nounced as well as the supreme court’s motive in redirecting Rule 37.1 ap-
 
 52. Id. at 2 n.2, 522 S.W.3d at 124 n.2. 
 53. Id., 522 S.W.3d at 124 n.2. 
 54. Id., 522 S.W.3d at 124, n.2 (emphasis added). The requirements for the contents of 
the abstract and the addendum required for briefs submitted in Arkansas appeals are set forth 
in Rule 4-2(a)(5)(A) and (a)(8)(A), respectively, of the Arkansas Supreme Court Rules. 
 55. Id., 522 S.W.3d at 124 n.2. 
 56. Id., 522 S.W.3d at 124 n.2 (emphasis added). 
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peals or the wisdom of this administrative decision. Finally, the reference in 
Mason to the number of judges, law clerks, and attorneys staffing the court 
of appeals suggests only that the intermediate court could readily absorb the 
shifted caseload. This could simply provide a point of clarification, or it 
could reflect the supreme court’s view that the court of appeals should not 
be considered to be overworked in terms of its docket and available re-
sources. 
Regardless of whether the court of appeals was less than diplomatic in 
taking its argument over the reassignment of appellate jurisdiction in Rule 
37.1 appeals public by addressing the situation in a published opinion, its 
criticism of the state supreme court clearly made its point. The inclusion of 
the decision to redirect those appeals raising claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel to the intermediate court in a footnote to an unsigned opinion 
seems less formal than appropriate. The supreme court could have accom-
plished this change by amending Rule 1-2(a) of the rules it is authorized to 
promulgate.57 Or, it could have announced the change in an order published 
in the official reports now included on the Judiciary website, as it had done 
with its order clarifying that appeal, not certiorari, is the proper procedure 
for reviewing adverse trial court decisions in habeas corpus actions.58 
The supreme court did clearly address its own appellate jurisdiction in 
Rule 37 proceedings in the Barnes footnote, providing that appeals from 
denials of postconviction relief in cases in which a death sentence or sen-
tence of life imprisonment has been imposed will continue to be heard by 
that court, rather than initially being directed to the court of appeals.59 A 
significant number of Rule 37 appeals are taken in cases in which the peti-
tioner has been sentenced to life imprisonment, either after trial60 or upon a 
plea of guilty.61 The supreme court’s familiarity with those cases may well 
 
 57. Bridgeman v. State, 2017 Ark. 321, at 2, 525 S.W.3d 459, 461. 
 58. See In re Review of Habeas Corpus Proceedings, 313 Ark. 168, 852 S.W.2d 791 
(1993). 
 59. Barnes v. State, 2017 Ark. 76, at 1 n.1, 511 S.W.3d 845, 846 n.1 (redirecting appel-
late review for Rule 37 appeals to the Arkansas Court of Appeals, “except in instances when 
the death penalty or life imprisonment has been imposed on the petitioner”). 
 60. E.g. Sykes v. State, 2011 Ark. 412, at 4–6, 2011 WL 4635021, at *2–3 (upholding 
trial court’s denial of postconviction relief on claim that trial counsel was ineffective on mul-
tiple grounds). The supreme court had previously upheld the conviction and life sentence for 
capital murder on direct appeal. Sykes v. State, 2009 Ark. 522, 357 S.W.3d 882. 
 61. In Sandoval-Vega v. State, the supreme court granted relief on the petitioner’s claim 
that the trial court had improperly accepted his plea of guilty to capital murder and imposed a 
sentence of life imprisonment before finding that he was competent to enter a plea to the 
charge, remanding the case for findings or evidentiary hearing on issue of defendant’s com-
petence. 2011 Ark. 393, at 6–10, 384 S.W.3d 508, 513–15. In Marlin v. State, the defendant 
who was charged with capital murder but pleaded guilty to the lesser-included offense of first 
degree murder, attempted to attack his conviction in a Rule 37.1 action. No. CR 03-586, 2003 
WL 22145827 (Ark. Sept. 18, 2003). Ultimately, the supreme court held that his postconvic-
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facilitate the review of issues raised in Rule 37.1 appeals because cases in-
volving life sentences are initially heard by that court on direct appeal.62 
Having already reviewed the facts and considered the issues raised in 
the direct appeal where counsel’s performance at trial would have been evi-
dent with respect to claims of defective performance in the record itself, the 
supreme court would seem well-positioned to assess the potential prejudice 
resulting from a claim of defective performance. Even if counsel’s claimed 
deficiency was not apparent in the appellate record but required develop-
ment in a Rule 37.1 hearing to be fully explained—such as a claim that 
counsel failed to investigate the case properly with respect to matters not 
raised at trial and, thus, not included in the trial record—the supreme court 
would still be well-positioned to evaluate the potential prejudice from coun-
sel’s failure, if any. 
Thus, reservation of Rule 37.1 direct appeals in cases involving life 
sentences would present no additional burden for the Arkansas Court of 
Appeals, while potentially expediting review of postconviction claims by 
the supreme court due to its familiarity with the trial record in the case. In 
the same general vein, Supreme Court Rule 1-2(a)(7) provides that jurisdic-
tion on direct appeal will lie in the Arkansas Supreme Court when it has 
previously heard the case.63 
Moreover, in reality, the number of pro se filings by inmates challeng-
ing their convictions or sentences pursuant to the Rule 37.1 remedy is sub-
 
tion petition was properly dismissed as untimely. Id. at *1. In Fretwell v. State, the defendant 
who pleaded guilty to capital murder on advice of counsel and was sentenced to life impris-
onment, the supreme court determined that he had suffered ineffective assistance of counsel 
and thus it granted postconviction relief, remanding for a new trial. 299 Ark. 306, 307, 722 
S.W.2d 334, 334 (1989). 
 62. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(a)(2) (providing that the supreme court has jurisdiction over 
“[c]riminal appeals in which the death penalty or life imprisonment has been imposed”). 
 63. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(a)(7) (providing that the supreme court has jurisdiction over 
“[s]econd or subsequent appeals following an appeal which has been decided in the Supreme 
Court”). For example, in Buckley v. State, the supreme court remanded for resentencing 
where the trial court had improperly admitted hearsay during punishment phase testimony at 
trial. 341 Ark. 864, 874–75, 20 S.W.3d 331, 338–39 (2000). The appeal was originally heard 
by the supreme court because Buckley’s jury had imposed life sentences on two delivery of 
cocaine counts involving less than one-quarter gram of cocaine on each occasion. Id. at 866, 
20 S.W.3d at 333. On remand for re-resentencing, the second jury imposed sentences of 
twenty-eight years for each count, and Buckley again appealed. Buckley v. State, 349 Ark. 
53, 60, 76 S.W.3d 825, 829 (2002). This second appeal was also heard by the supreme court, 
which affirmed. Id. at 70–71, 76 S.W.3d at 836. Thereafter, the supreme court heard Buck-
ley’s appeal from denial of relief on his Rule 37.1 petition by the trial court, initially revers-
ing and remanding for evidentiary hearing. Buckley v. State, No. CR 04-554, 2005 WL 
1411654, at *3 (Ark. June 16, 2005). Following the hearing, the supreme court denied relief 
on Buckley’s appeal. Buckley v. State, No. CR 04-554, 2007 WL 1509323, at *2 (Ark. June 
16, 2005). The supreme court heard the appeal from resentencing based upon Arkansas Su-
preme Court Rule 1-2(a)(7). 
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stantial,64 many of which undoubtedly fail to comply with the strict format-
ting requirements for petitions65 and are consequently subject to dismissal 
for noncompliance.66 Disposition of pro se filings may not require the ex-
penditure of resources equivalent to, or necessary for the disposition of, civil 
and criminal matters in which counsel are involved because of the pro se 
petitioner’s failure to comply with the requisite formatting requirements for 
the petition;67 failure to verify the petition;68 failure to support a claimed 
 
 64. For example, the court explained in its 1987 order referring to Rule 37: 
[W]e are being inundated with petitions, mostly from inmates of the Arkansas 
Department of Correction, seeking relief under Rule 37. Each petition must be 
reviewed and considered, however involved, and most are lengthy and detailed. 
We have a fulltime lawyer and secretary serving to handle such petitions and as-
sist the court. We have had to add another part-time lawyer to the staff. All of 
this work is related to petitions filed by prisoners. In 1986, 189 such petitions 
were filed with written opinions issued in the majority of the cases, usually find-
ing them meritless. They are invariably handwritten, lengthy (a recent one was 
100 pages long), and generally attempt to retry the case or attempt to prove their 
lawyer incompetent. The three year time limitation in which petitions may be 
filed is ignored. Also, the rule that states only one petition may be filed is often 
ignored. 
In re Rule 37, Rules of Criminal Procedure, 293 Ark. 609, 609, 732 S.W.2d 458, 458 (1987) 
(emphasis added). 
 65. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.1(b) (including specific margin lengths, at least 1½ inches on 
the left and right sides of the page and at least 2 inches at the top and bottom of the page; 
number of lines per page, 30; and number of words per line, 15). 
 66. Id. Section (b) also provides: “The circuit court or appellate court may dismiss any 
petition that fails to comply with this subsection.” Id. The rule does not specify whether “ap-
pellate court” refers to either the supreme court or court of appeals, but until Barnes, the 
supreme court had consistently held that it had jurisdiction to review appeals from circuit 
court orders rendered in Rule 37 actions. 
 67. E.g., White v. State, No. CR 07-312, 2007 WL 2793286 (Ark. Sept. 27, 2007). The 
supreme court upheld the trial court’s dismissal of the pro se petition and appeal, finding: 
Specifically, the court found that appellant’s petition was fourteen pages in 
length, exceeded thirty lines per page and did not meet the requirements for left, 
right, upper, or lower margins. While the petition contained in the record was 
twelve-pages in length rather than fourteen, an examination of the petition con-
tained in the record substantially supports the trial court’s findings. 
Id. at *1. The court explained the rationale for enforcing strict compliance with the formatting 
requirements for post-conviction petitions: 
The restrictions in Rule 37.1 placed upon lines per page, words per line and mar-
gins require little more than an ability to count and measure with a ruler. The re-
strictions are neither burdensome, unduly time-consuming, nor unreasonable, and 
appellant has not demonstrated that the court erred in requiring him to comply 
with Rule 37.1(b). 
Id. 
 68. Bridgeman v. State, 2017 Ark. 76, at 2, 511 S.W.3d 846, 846 (citing Keck v. State, 
2013 Ark. 139, at 5, 2013 WL 1385240, at *3 (per curiam)). Rule 37.1(d) requires that the 
Rule petition be verified by the petitioner. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.1(d). For additional discussion 
of the verification requirement, see supra note 9. 
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violation with sufficient legal authority69 or facts70 to warrant relief; or fail-
ure to include an abstract of the trial deemed necessary for resolution of the 
issues on appeal.71 Nevertheless, regardless of the fact that disposition of 
petitions failing for these reasons may appear routine, a panel of the court of 
appeals will presumably still be required to consider the appeal from denial 
of Rule 37 relief and make the decision to dismiss the petition as meritless 
or procedurally defaulted.72 
The conclusion of the “skirmish” over reassignment of appellate re-
view of trial court rulings denying relief on Rule 37.1 petitions could hardly 
have been in doubt. Regardless of the abruptness of the supreme court’s 
announcement of the change in appellate, its order was basically final upon 
announcement in Barnes. The court of appeals has accepted its responsibil-
ity73 with little objection other than Judge Whiteaker’s comments in 
Bridgeman,74 hearing appeals and upholding trial court decisions denying 
relief.75 
 
 69. E.g., Polivka v. State, 2010 Ark. 152, at 14–15, 362 S.W.3d 918, 928 (“Appellant 
fails to cite any authority or make a convincing argument that his trial attorney had a duty to 
object to the jury instructions made by the court. It is in fact not a violation of the doctrine of 
separation of powers for a court to instruct the jury on parole and transfer eligibility. We will 
not entertain arguments unsupported by any legal authority.”) (citations omitted). 
 70. See, e.g., Weatherford v. State, 363 Ark. 579, 586, 215 S.W.3d 642, 648–49 (2005) 
(upholding the trial court’s denial of relief on ineffective assistance of counsel claim where 
Rule 37.1 did not provide sufficient factual evidence of witness’s proposed testimony and its 
claimed effect on trial despite postconviction counsel’s request to expand page limitations to 
permit development of argument which was denied by trial court). 
 71. The current rules provide that a deficient brief may be corrected at the direction of 
the clerk or court, ARK. SUP. CT. R. 4-2(b)(3), but the supreme court has also simply dis-
missed appeals or affirmed cases based on deficiencies in the brief in the past. See e.g., Hub-
bard v. State, 334 Ark. 321, 324, 973 S.W.2d 804, 806 (1998) (affirming denial of relief in a 
per curiam opinion for failure to include an abstract of the trial in the appellate brief). The 
rule continues to authorize disposition by dismissal or affirmance when a party fails to cor-
rect a deficient brief after having been afforded notice and an opportunity to comply with the 
applicable rule. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 4-2. 
 72. There are apparently no published rules regarding criteria for the exercise of discre-
tion in dismissing Rule 37.1 appeals for noncompliance with rules governing the formatting 
or the verification of pleadings or appellate briefs, nor is there any published rule requiring 
that the appeal be considered and ruled on by the reviewing court, or by a single justice or 
judge of the reviewing court. 
 73. See, e.g., Slater v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 499, at 1, 583 S.W.3d 84, 86 (“We assumed 
jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to footnote 1 in Barnes v. State, 2017 Ark. 76, 511 
S.W.3d 845 (per curiam).”). 
 74. See supra notes 23–32 and accompanying text. 
 75. E.g., Shadwick v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 243, at 12, 519 S.W.3d 722, 732 (upholding 
denial of relief on claim that trial counsel was ineffective for numerous reasons, including 
failure to object to State’s assertion of territorial jurisdiction where computer images of minor 
children claimed to have been sent from Arkansas to defendant and downloaded when he was 
living in Montana). The court of appeals issued its decision in Shadwick on April 19, 2017, 
shortly after the supreme court ordered the court of appeals to assume jurisdiction over Rule 
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III. POST-TRIAL REMEDIES UNDER ARKANSAS LAW 
The conclusion of the direct appeal process in the criminal case does 
not preclude the convicted defendant from continuing to litigate issues that 
may have arisen in the case, including issues that may have only arisen after 
the trial or after the direct appeal. These remedies are often referred to as 
“collateral” because they afford means to attack a conviction or sentence 
outside the trial and appellate process.76 Commonly, they are referred to as 
“habeas corpus,” although habeas corpus under Arkansas law refers to spe-
cific challenges governed by statute.77 The basic postconviction remedy rec-
ognized in Arkansas is the Rule 37 procedure created by the Arkansas Su-
preme Court.78 
The Federal Constitution does not recognize the right of a criminal de-
fendant to post-trial process for challenging the conviction or sentence, as 
the Arkansas Supreme Court noted in an order issued in 1987.79 The court 
described the situation it confronted at the time, after noting that there was 
no duty upon the states to provide postconviction remedies.80 The court 
complained: 
Seldom is relief or a new trial granted under Rule 37. Yet, we are being 
inundated with petitions, mostly from inmates of the Arkansas Depart-
ment of Correction, seeking relief under Rule 37. Each petition must be 
reviewed and considered, however involved, and most are lengthy and 
detailed. We have a fulltime lawyer and secretary serving to handle such 
petitions and assist the court. We have had to add another part-time law-
yer to the staff. All of this work is related to petitions filed by prisoners. 
In 1986, 189 such petitions were filed with written opinions issued in the 
majority of the cases, usually finding them meritless. They are invariably 
handwritten, lengthy (a recent one was 100 pages long), and generally at-
tempt to retry the case or attempt to prove their lawyer incompetent. The 
 
37.1 appeals alleging ineffective assistance of counsel on March 2, 2017. See id., 519 S.W.3d 
722; see also Barnes v. State, 2017 Ark. 76, at 1 n.1, 511 S.W.3d 845, 846 n.1. 
 76. See, e.g., Wall v. Kholi, 562 U.S. 545, 552–53 (2011) (defining “collateral review” 
and related term “collateral attack” as “indirect” attack on a judgment, often referred to as 
“habeas corpus”). 
 77. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-101 (West 2019). 
 78. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.1. 
 79. In re Rule 37, Rules of Criminal Procedure, 293 Ark. 609, 609, 732 S.W.2d 458, 
458 (1987); see also Maulding v. State, 299 Ark. 570, 571, 776 S.W.2d 339, 340 (1989) 
(“States are not obligated to provide for post-conviction relief after the defendant has failed to 
secure relief through direct review of his conviction.” (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 
U.S. 551, 557 (1987))). 
 80. In re Rule 37, 293 Ark. at 609, 732 S.W.2d at 458 (citing Finley, 481 U.S. at 556–
57). 
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three year time limitation in which petitions may be filed is ignored. Al-
so the rule that states only one petition may be filed is often ignored.
81
 
Rather, the court recognized that “some relief should exist to set aside void 
convictions;” continuing, “however, the remaining grounds for relief should 
be reexamined.”82 It then concluded its order by referring the question of 
continuing postconviction remedies in the then-current form for review to 
the court’s advisory committee.83 The court’s observation that relief is sel-
dom granted or that a new trial is rarely ordered under Rule 37 is confirmed 
by Justice Josephine Linker Hart’s comment in a recent concurring opinion: 
In the nearly thirty years since this court created the rule, I am aware of 
only two cases in which a prisoner received a new trial pursuant to Rule 
37: Flores v. State, 350 Ark. 198, 85 S.W.3d 896 (2002), and Rackley v. 
State, 2014 Ark. 39, 2014 WL 346713. Meanwhile, the procedural de-
faults that are distressingly common when an inmate attempts to invoke 
Rule 37 bars [sic] the inmate from pursuing habeas relief in federal 
court.
84
 
 
 81. Id., 732 S.W.2d at 458. 
 82. Id. at 610, 732 S.W.2d at 458. 
 83. Id., 732 S.W.2d at 458 (“We refer to the Supreme Court Committee on Rules of 
Pleading, Practice and Procedure in Criminal Cases for consideration of the question of 
whether and under what circumstances should we provide for and maintain a postconviction 
proceeding.”). 
 84. McClinton v. State, 2018 Ark. 116, at 6–7, 542 S.W.3d 859, 863–64 (Hart, J., con-
curring). Justice Hart continued: 
I believe that Rule 37 could have been an invaluable tool for this court to assess 
whether the State of Arkansas is providing competent counsel as the state and 
federal constitutions require. Effectiveness of counsel should be judged not 
merely on whether a case is won or lost but also on whether defense counsel was 
competent enough to help the finder of fact to decide the nature and level of cul-
pability for a particular criminal act. Determining the proper level of culpability 
directly corresponds to the length of a prison sentence. Without a competent de-
fense, a criminal defendant could easily receive a much greater sentence than the 
law contemplates. With Arkansas’s prison population exceeding 19,000, ineffec-
tive counsel is something that we simply cannot afford. 
Id. at 7–8, 543 S.W.3d at 864. 
  With respect to Justice Hart’s reference to the two cases in which new trials had 
been granted in Rule 37 actions, it is worth noting that the supreme court ordered relief on 
appeal from a denial of relief on the Rule 37.1 petition in Conley v. State, 2014 Ark. 172, at 
13, 433 S.W.3d 234, 243. There, the court ordered dismissal of convictions on two counts of 
the three-count information on which the petitioner had been convicted, while upholding his 
conviction on Count 1, which charged delivery of cocaine—a sale of $100 worth of cocaine 
base to undercover officers—that resulted in imposition of a sixty-year enhanced sentence. 
Id. at 12, 433 S.W.3d at 243. The thirty-year term on the two counts that were ordered dis-
missed for lack of sufficient evidence was vacated when the supreme court found that trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve his challenge of insufficient evidence on those 
counts at trial. Id., 433 S.W.3d at 243. 
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A. Post-Trial Remedies Are Not Mandated by the Federal Constitution 
The rights accorded by the Sixth Amendment expressly address the tri-
al process, and the Federal Constitution is otherwise silent with respect to 
post-trial proceedings.85 There is no constitutional provision requiring a state 
to provide the criminal defendant with the option of filing a motion for new 
trial,86 although States may choose to afford litigants the right to move for 
new trial, as Arkansas does.87 
Similarly, the Federal Constitution does not expressly provide for ap-
peal from a criminal conviction.88 The Supreme Court essentially grafted a 
right to direct appeal on state criminal process by relying on the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause89 to hold that once a state has created 
a right of appeal that could be accessed by financially capable litigants, in-
digent defendants must be accorded similar access.90 Thus, in Griffin v. Illi-
nois,91 the Court required states to provide a free copy of the record of pro-
ceedings in the trial court, or its equivalent,92 to permit the indigent appellant 
 
 85. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The precise language of the Sixth Amendment guarantees, 
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of 
counsel for his defence.” The amendment does not refer to trial, appeal or post-conviction 
proceedings with respect to the scope of the guarantee, but the Supreme Court has consistent-
ly held that the right to assistance of counsel does not extend to post-conviction proceedings 
because the Constitutional does not expressly address the right to post-conviction process at 
all. There is no right to post-conviction review, as the Court explained in Pennsylvania v. 
Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987) (“States have no obligation to provide this avenue of re-
lief”) and, consequently, there is no right to assistance or effective assistance of counsel in 
post-conviction proceedings, even in capital cases in which a state court defendant has been 
sentenced to death. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1989). 
 86. For instance, there is no mention of a right to file a motion for new trial in the Con-
stitution, as the Supreme Court of the United States explained in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 
390, 400 (1993). 
 87. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 33.3. 
 88. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894) (“An appeal from a judgment of 
conviction is not a matter of absolute right, independently of constitutional or statutory provi-
sions allowing such appeal.”). In McKane, the Court did recognize that many jurisdictions 
had created a right to appeal from criminal convictions, but holding that this did not require a 
finding that a right to appeal was necessarily implicit in the Federal Constitution, concluding: 
“whether an appeal should be allowed, and, if so, under what circumstances, or on what con-
ditions, are matters for each state to determine for itself.” Id. at 688. The right of appeal under 
Arkansas law is included in the state constitution. ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 11. 
 89. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 90. For a summary of the process used by the Court to impose a constitutional require-
ment for access to state appellate process for indigent criminal defendants, see Smith v. Rob-
bins, 528 U.S. 259, 276–77 (2000). 
 91. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
 92. Id. at 20. Subsequently, in Eskridge v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms and 
Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958) and Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Court 
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comparable means to frame the argument on appeal with support from the 
record of the proceedings in the court below.93 
The appellate right was significantly extended in Douglas v. Califor-
nia,94 when the same equal protection analysis was applied to require assis-
tance of counsel to indigent criminal appellants.95 However, the Douglas 
 
addressed whether an alternative to the complete trial court record could suffice. The Draper 
Court explained: 
In all cases the duty of the State is to provide the indigent as adequate and effec-
tive an appellate review as that given appellants with funds—the State must pro-
vide the indigent defendant with means of presenting his contention to the appel-
late court which are as good as those available to a nonindigent defendant with 
similar contentions. 
372 U.S. at 496. As a practical matter, however, counsel appointed to represent the indigent 
defendant on appeal often cannot determine which issues should be raised on appeal in the 
exercise of their best professional judgment without having an opportunity to review the 
complete record of the proceedings in the trial court. Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748, 752 
(1967) (appointed counsel’s failure to file record on appeal, without notice to client, resulted 
in ineffective assistance by denying client appeal on the record). 
 93. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18–19. The majority based its equal protection analysis on its 
recognition of the prevalence and significance of systems for appellate review in the states: 
All of the States now provide some method of appeal from criminal convictions, 
recognizing the importance of appellate review to a correct adjudication of guilt 
or innocence. Statistics show that a substantial proportion of criminal convictions 
are reversed by state appellate courts. Thus to deny adequate review to the poor 
means that many of them may lose their life, liberty or property because of unjust 
convictions which appellate courts would set aside. 
Id.; see also Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 258 (1959) (state rule requiring all appellants to 
pay filing fee violated indigent’s right to review, precluding even defective appeal based on 
insufficient record, as addressed in Griffin). 
 94. 372 U.S. 353, 356–58 (1963). 
 95. Id. The implied Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel, 
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970), applies to counsel appointed to rep-
resent an indigent appellant in the first step of the direct appeal. See, e.g., Smith v. Robbins, 
528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) (standard for assessing claim of ineffective assistance on appeal is 
that announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–91 (1984), requiring proof of 
defective performance on counsel’s part not attributable to an objectively reasonable strategic 
decision that resulted in reasonable probability of different outcome in the proceedings); 
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396–97 (1985) (failure to timely file required docketing notice 
resulted in ineffective assistance when appeal dismissed). The Smith Court explained: 
Respondent must first show that his counsel was objectively unreasonable, see 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–691 [], in failing to find arguable issues to appeal—
that is, that counsel unreasonably failed to discover nonfrivolous issues and to 
file a merits brief raising them. If Robbins succeeds in such a showing, he then 
has the burden of demonstrating prejudice. That is, he must show a reasonable 
probability that, but for his counsel’s unreasonable failure to file a merits brief, 
he would have prevailed on his appeal. 
528 U.S. at 285; see also Burnside v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 691, at 4, 537 S.W.3d 796, 803 
(“Appellate counsel’s failure to raise a specific issue must have amounted to error of such 
magnitude that it rendered appellate counsel’s performance constitutionally deficient under 
the Strickland criteria.”). 
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Court also limited the implied constitutional right to a direct appeal to a one-
step process, therefore declining to extend the right to assistance of counsel 
to discretionary appeals in state courts or federal courts: 
We are dealing only with the first appeal, granted as a matter of right to 
rich and poor alike from a criminal conviction. We need not now decide 
whether California would have to provide counsel for an indigent seek-
ing a discretionary hearing from the California Supreme Court after the 
District Court of Appeal had sustained his conviction, or whether coun-
sel must be appointed for an indigent seeking review of an appellate af-
firmance of his conviction in this Court by appeal as of right or by peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari which lies within the Court’s discretion.96 
Similarly, there is no mention of postconviction or collateral process 
for collateral attack on a criminal conviction or sentence in the Sixth 
Amendment.97 The Court drew the constitutional line differentiating the 
right to the single-step appeal and discretionary review in Ross v. Moffitt.98 
There, the Court held that the Constitution does not afford an indigent crim-
inal appellant the right to assistance of counsel in petitioning the Supreme 
Court by writ of certiorari to review a state court rejection of his federal 
constitutional claim, nor the right to counsel in a state discretionary appeal, 
in contrast to the right to counsel in the first appeal noted by the Douglas 
Court.99 Because there is no express or inferred right to discretionary review 
in the language of the Federal Constitution, the Ross Court found that there 
was no right to assistance of counsel in prosecuting a discretionary petition: 
“We do not believe that the Due Process Clause requires North Carolina to 
provide respondent with counsel on his discretionary appeal to the State 
Supreme Court.”100 
Nevertheless, states have created systems for postconviction or collat-
eral review of criminal convictions.101 They vary in terms of procedure but, 
 
 96. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 356 (citations omitted). 
 97. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987) (“States have no obligation to 
provide this avenue of relief.” (citing United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 323 (1976) 
(plurality opinion))). 
 98. 417 U.S. 600, 610–11 (1974). 
 99. The Ross majority questioned the reasoning of Douglas: “The precise rationale for 
the Griffin and Douglas lines of cases has never been explicitly stated, some support being 
derived from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and some from the 
Due Process Clause of that Amendment.” Id. at 608–09. 
 100. Id. at 610. The Arkansas Supreme Court has similarly held that there is no right to 
assistance of counsel in Arkansas postconviction proceedings. Williams v. Porch, 2018 Ark. 
1, at 3, 534 S.W.3d 152, 154 (“We have also made clear that the appointment of counsel in 
postconviction proceedings is discretionary and not mandated.” (citing Mancia v. State, 2015 
Ark. 115, at 27, 459 S.W.3d 259, 276)). 
 101. The variation in postconviction process adopted by the states prompted the Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws to propose a model statute designed to eliminate inconsisten-
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generally, permit a convicted defendant an option for raising issues that un-
dermine the integrity of the conviction or sentence. While the lack of any 
express requirement for provision for postconviction attack on the criminal 
conviction or sentence in the Federal Constitution has been noted by the 
Arkansas Supreme Court, it has also held that once the state has provided a 
postconviction process for state court defendants, the process must be fair.102 
Fairness in operation of postconviction proceedings is a particularly elusive 
concept because the petitioning criminal defendant is not only not afforded a 
right to assistance of counsel in the postconviction litigation process, there is 
also no Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective representation. Even in 
capital cases in which the postconviction petitioner has been sentenced to 
death, ineffective representation in state or federal proceedings will not pro-
vide an avenue for relief from execution of the sentence.103 Thus, in Cole-
man v. Thompson,104 the Court held that state postconviction counsel’s fail-
ure to appeal from the trial court’s denial of relief, which resulted in a pro-
cedural default of Coleman’s claims, did not warrant federal habeas relief.105 
Moreover, claims of ineffectiveness of counsel in state and federal 
postconviction proceedings do not generally afford the postconviction peti-
tioner claims for relief from adverse decisions in those proceedings in the 
federal habeas corpus process, as provided by the controlling statute.106 
 
cy in state procedures over sixty years ago. See The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, 
69 HARV. L. REV. 1289 (1956). The states have not responded to eliminate these inconsisten-
cies. The state postconviction process remains largely individualized by statute or rule. See 
ALA. R. CRIM. P. 32.1; ALASKA STAT. § 12.72.010 (West 2019); 16A A.R.S. R. CRIM. P. 32.1; 
ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.1; SUP. CT. CRIM. R. 61; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850; IDAHO CODE §§ 19-4901 
to -4911 (West 2019); 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 2019); IND. R.P. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES 
1; IOWA CODE ANN. § 822.2 (West 2019); KY. R. CR. P. 11.42; TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ART. 
11.01. 
 102. In Watkins v. State, 2010 Ark. 156, 362 S.W.3d 910, the Arkansas Supreme Court 
reiterated: “While there is no constitutional right to a post-conviction proceeding, when a 
state undertakes to provide collateral relief, due process requires that the proceeding be fun-
damentally fair.”. Id. at 5, 362 S.W.3d at 914–15 (citing Engram v. State, 360 Ark. 140, 200 
S.W.3d 367 (2004); Porter v. State, 339 Ark. 15, 2 S.W.3d 73 (1999)). 
 103. See Andrew Hammel, Effective Performance Guarantees for Capital State Post-
Conviction Counsel: Cutting the Gordian Knot, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 347, 354–60 
(2003) (surveying jurisdictions imposing requirement for effective assistance of postconvic-
tion counsel in state postconviction proceedings). 
 104. 501 U.S. 722 (1991). 
 105. Id. at 752–53; see also Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587 (1982) (holding no 
constitutional violation based on counsel’s defective performance in representation in state 
discretionary review proceeding following direct appeal). 
 106. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) (2018) (“The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during 
Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a 
proceeding arising under section 2254.”). The single exception to this rule was judicially-
created. Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013); Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012). In 
Davila v. Davis, the Court refused to expand upon that exception, explaining: 
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B. Suspension, Then Reinstatement, of Rule 37 in 1989 
Interestingly, for a brief period of time, the defendant convicted in an 
Arkansas circuit court did not have a specific postconviction remedy at all. 
The Arkansas Supreme Court abolished its earlier version of Rule 37 by 
order entered on May 30, 1989,107 and for some period of time, a defend-
ant’s postconviction remedy under state law was limited to proceeding un-
der Rule 36.4,108 which permitted the defendant to allege ineffective assis-
tance by his trial counsel by motion for new trial filed within thirty days of 
judgment.109 The claim of ineffectiveness raised in this procedure would 
then be merged with the claims raised on direct appeal from the trial and 
conviction to consolidate the appellate process into a single action.110 The 
court reinstated Rule 37, which was facially less limited than the Rule 36.4 
procedure, some fifteen months later.111 In an effort to expedite the postcon-
viction process, the court reduced the time for filing for relief under Rule 37 
from three years—under the previous rule—to sixty days when the defend-
ant has appealed from a conviction by trial or ninety days when the defend-
ant’s conviction results from a guilty plea.112 The newly modified and rea-
dopted Rule 37 became effective on January 1, 1991.113 An example of the 
 
In Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 [] (2012), and Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 [] 
(2013), this Court announced a narrow exception to Coleman’s general rule. That 
exception treats ineffective assistance by a prisoner’s state postconviction coun-
sel as cause to overcome the default of a single claim—ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel—in a single context—where the State effectively requires a defend-
ant to bring that claim in state postconviction proceedings rather than on direct 
appeal. The question in this case is whether we should extend that exception to 
allow federal courts to consider a different kind of defaulted claim—ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel. We decline to do so. 
137 S. Ct. 2058, 2062–63 (2017); see infra note 295–96 and accompanying text for further 
discussion of Davila v. Davis. 
 107. In re Abolishment of Rule 37 & the Revision of Rule 36 of the Ark. Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure, 299 Ark. 573, 770 S.W.2d 148 (1989); see Whitmore v. State, 299 Ark. 55, 
62, 771 S.W.2d 266, 269 (1989) (explaining effect of change in postconviction process). 
 108. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 36.4. 
 109. Id. In Looney v. State, the court of appeals addressed the trial court’s failure to ad-
monish the defendant concerning his right, pursuant to Rule 36.4, to assert a claim of ineffec-
tive assistance of trial counsel and explained the history of the change in postconviction 
procedure. 32 Ark. App. 191, 192–93, 798 S.W.2d 452, 452–53 (1990). The court remanded 
the case for compliance with the provisions of the rule. Id. at 193, 798 S.W.2d at 453. 
 110. Whitmore, 299 Ark. at 62, 771 S.W.2d at 269. 
 111. See In re Reinstatement of Rule 37 of Ark. Rules of Criminal Procedure, as Revised, 
and the Amendment of Rule 26.1 and Rule 36.4 of the Ark. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 303 
Ark. 746, 797 S.W.2d 458 (1990); In re Post-Conviction Procedure, 303 Ark. 745, 797 
S.W.2d 458 (1990). 
 112. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.2(c). 
 113. In re Reinstatement of Rule 37 of Ark. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 303 Ark. 746, 
979 S.W.2d 458. 
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implications of this change in Arkansas postconviction process was ex-
plained in Hubbard v. State:114 
At the time of Hubbard’s conviction, Arkansas Criminal Procedure Rule 
37 had been abolished and was replaced with Rule 36.4. Under Rule 
36.4, a defendant who wished to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel had to do so in a motion for a new trial within thirty days of the 
date of the judgment. Although it is unclear whether Hubbard filed such 
a motion, he subsequently pursued habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2254 in federal court. On November 5, 1995, the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas ordered that a writ of 
habeas corpus would issue “unless, within ninety (90) days, petitioner is 
allowed to prosecute with the benefit of counsel, Rule 36.4 proceedings 
in Monroe County Circuit Court and an appeal if desired.
115
 
Following reinstatement by the supreme court, Rule 37 has remained the 
primary vehicle for postconviction, or collateral, attacks on convictions un-
der Arkansas law.116 However, the overall scheme of remedies is rather Byz-
antine, including both legislative and judicially created remedies principally 
defined by specific subject matter. 
There are, in fact, a number of postconviction remedies that may be 
available to Arkansas litigants to challenge unfavorable trial court disposi-
tions and with which counsel should be familiar.117 The supreme court’s 
order in Barnes, however, appears to affect only appeals from Rule 37 ac-
tions brought in circuit courts. This is because the other remedies do not 
 
 114. 334 Ark. 321, 322, 973 S.W.2d 804, 805 (1998); see also Kindall v. State, 2010 Ark. 
342, 1 nn.1–2, 2010 WL 3721971, at *1 nn.1–2 (explaining retroactive implications of aboli-
tion of Rule 37 in individual case). 
 115. Hubbard, 334 Ark. at 322, 973 S.W.2d at 805. 
 116. In Spears v. State, the court of appeals explained that the reinstatement of Rule 37 
resulted in deletion of the previous requirement that the defendant petition the appellate court 
for leave to file the postconviction petition. No. CR 83-20, 1997 WL 618681, at *1 n.1 (Ark. 
App. Oct. 2, 1997); see also Moss v. State, 3010 Ark. 284, at 1 n.1, 2010 WL 2210933, at *1 
n.1. (explaining that under prior rule, Rule 37 petitioner convicted on his plea of guilty was 
required to obtain leave from Arkansas Supreme Court to petition for relief, requiring show-
ing that the conviction was a nullity, such as trial court’s lack of jurisdiction or violation of 
double jeopardy). Rule 37.2(c)(i) no longer imposes the requirement that the petitioner first 
obtain leave from the supreme court or, after Barnes, to file the Rule 37 petition. Instead, a 
petitioner seeking relief from a conviction obtained on a plea of guilty may now file the peti-
tion without first obtaining leave to file “within ninety (90) days of the date of entry of judg-
ment” if no appeal was taken from the conviction. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.2(c)(i). 
In its footnote, the court cited In re Reinstatement of Rule 37 of Ark. Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, 303 Ark. 746, 979 S.W.2d 458, but erroneously cited the Southwestern Reporter 
citation as volume “979” when the citation to the supreme court’s order issued October 29, 
1990, actually appears at “797 S.W.2d 458,” while Westlaw responds with no citation re-
quested for “303 Ark. 746.” Spears, 1997 WL 618681, at *1 n.1. 
 117. See infra Section III.D. 
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afford relief for claims brought as challenges to counsel’s performance as 
defective under the Sixth Amendment, compromised by actual conflict of 
interest impairing or distorting counsel’s performance, or in the rare case, by 
rules or state action compromising counsel’s ability to perform effectively. 
C. Rule 37 Practice 
The appeal in Barnes was characterized by the Arkansas Supreme 
Court as arising from a denial of postconviction relief in an action brought 
under Rule 37.1 of the criminal procedure rules,118 although the pro se liti-
gant styled his motion in the trial court as a “belated motion to retract” his 
guilty plea.119 In his pleading Barnes argued that his guilty plea was tainted 
by trial counsel’s ineffective assistance.120 On appeal, the supreme court 
held that claims attacking counsel’s effectiveness must be prosecuted under 
Rule 37.1.121 The precise issues raised on the appeal involved Barnes’s re-
quest for appointment of counsel, a copy of the record, and an extension of 
time to file the appellate brief,122 but the court interpreted the thrust of his 
claim to be ineffective assistance of counsel, cognizable only pursuant Rule 
37.1 regardless of the title of the pleading.123 
Rule 37.1 provides a remedy for inmates124 challenging their convic-
tions or sentences in the state’s circuit courts that must be filed in the court 
 
 118. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.1. The rule provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) A petitioner in custody under sentence of a circuit court claiming a right to be 
released, or to have a new trial, or to have the original sentence modified on the 
ground: 
(i) that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution and laws of the 
United States or this state; or 
(ii) that the court imposing the sentence was without jurisdiction to do so; or 
(iii) that the sentence was in excess of the maximum sentence authorized by law; 
or 
(iv) that the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack; may file a verified 
petition in the court which imposed the sentence, praying that the sentence be 
vacated or corrected. 
ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.1(a). 
 119. Barnes v. State, 2017 Ark. 76, at 1, 511 S.W.3d 845, 845. 
 120. Id., 511 S.W.3d at 845. 
 121. Id. at 1–2, 511 S.W.3d at 845 (“A petition for postconviction relief mounting a col-
lateral attack on a judgment, regardless of the label placed on it by the petitioner, is consid-
ered pursuant to our postconviction rule.”). 
 122. Id. at 2, 511 S.W.3d at 846. 
 123. The court explained that Barnes apparently sought to avoid dismissal based on his 
failure to file a verified petition, as required by Rule 37.1(c) of the Arkansas Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure, by styling his petition as a “belated motion to retract” his guilty plea. Id. at 2–
3, 511 S.W.3d at 846–47. 
 124. The Arkansas Supreme Court has limited the right to petition for postconviction 
relief to the remedy provided by Rule 37.1(a) to convicted defendants “in custody.” See supra 
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of conviction within sixty days after the conclusion of the direct appeal, if 
the case is appealed, or within ninety days of entry of the judgment and sen-
tence on a plea of guilty when there is no appeal taken in the case.125 
In considering the petition on its merits, the trial court of conviction126 
may order an evidentiary hearing on contested issues of fact or law,127 or 
dispose of the petition without hearing but with findings that may then be 
addressed on appeal from its denial of relief.128 The standard for review of 
the circuit court’s determination that relief is not warranted is high, requir-
ing a finding that the trial court’s decision is clearly erroneous; the court 
explained in Wood v. State:129 
Our standard of review in Rule 37.1 petitions is that, “on appeal from a 
circuit court’s ruling on a petitioner’s request for Rule 37 relief, this 
 
note 4 and accompanying text. A convicted defendant not in custody interested in asserting 
federal constitutional claims challenging his conviction and sentence that would otherwise be 
cognizable under Rule 37.1, may, however, proceed to present those federal claims to the 
United States District Court pursuant to the federal habeas corpus statute applicable for state 
court defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2018); see Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491 (1989) 
(“Our interpretation of the ‘in custody’ language has not required that a prisoner be physical-
ly confined in order to challenge his sentence on habeas corpus.”). 
 125. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.2(c)(i)–(ii); see Wicks v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 499, at 9, 375 
S.W.3d 769, 774 (“Appellant was required to pursue postconviction relief under Rule 37.1 
within ninety days of the date of the entry of judgment. The time limitations in Rule 37.2(c) 
are jurisdictional in nature, and, where they are not met, a trial court lacks jurisdiction to 
grant postconviction relief.” (citing Carter v. State, 2010 Ark. 231, 364 S.W.3d 46)); accord 
Harris v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 381, at 8–9, 526 S.W.3d 43, 49. 
 126. Rule 37 does not directly refer to a requirement that the petition for postconviction 
relief must be filed in the circuit court in which the conviction was obtained. However, in 
Rule 37.2, there are references to the “appropriate circuit court.” ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.2(c)(i), 
(iii)– (iv). In subsection (a) the rule explains that if there is an appeal pending from the con-
viction in the “original case,” when a Rule 37 petition is filed, “no proceedings under this 
rule shall be entertained by the circuit court while the appeal is pending.” ARK. R. CRIM. P. 
37.2(a). 
 127. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.3(c). 
 128. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.3(a) (“If the petition and the files and records of the case con-
clusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief, the trial court shall make written 
findings to that effect, specifying any parts of the files, or records that are relied upon to 
sustain the court’s findings.”); see, e.g., Henington v. State, 2012 Ark. 181, at 5–6, 403 
S.W.3d 55, 59–60 (affirming denial of relief on written findings of trial court, cautioning that 
trial court should hold evidentiary hearing “unless the files and record of the case conclusive-
ly show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief”); accord England v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 
137, at 11–15, 543 S.W.3d 553, 562–64 (holding that trial counsel’s failure to move to sever 
counts involving two victims of incestuous sexual assault did not constitute defective perfor-
mance where petitioner could not show severance motion would have been meritorious, and 
holding that lack of merit because offenses against victims intertwined, as both were present 
at the same time during some assaults and would be available to testify against defendant in 
joint trial). 
 129. 2015 Ark. 477, 478 S.W.3d 194. 
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court will not reverse the circuit court’s decision granting or denying 
post-conviction relief unless it is clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly 
erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate 
court, after reviewing the entire evidence is left with the definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”130 
If the petition is meritorious, the circuit court may order relief from the con-
viction or sentence imposed.131 
Despite the apparently broad grant of jurisdiction provided, the relief 
available in an action brought pursuant to Rule 37 is actually quite limited 
by case law, whether under Rule 37.1, which generally governs the authority 
of the trial court, or Rule 37.5, which specifically addresses the postconvic-
tion action brought by a defendant sentenced to death.132 
1. Limiting the Scope of Review in Rule 37 Postconviction Actions 
While the language of Rule 37.1 is very broad in authorizing attacks on 
sentences—and, by implication, convictions—the petitioner’s ability to do 
so is extremely limited by case law. First, the court has consistently viewed 
postconviction proceedings as a procedural vehicle for addressing claims 
that could not have been addressed in the trial and direct appeal process. For 
 
 130. Id. at 2–3, 478 S.W.3d at 197 (quoting Mason v. State, 2013 Ark. 492, at 1–2, 430 
S.W.3d 759, 761); accord Slater v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 499, at 4, 583 S.W.3d 84, 88. 
 131. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.4 (“If the circuit court finds that for any reason the petitioner is 
entitled to relief, then the circuit court may set aside the original judgment, discharge the 
petitioner, resentence him or her, grant a new trial, or otherwise correct the sentence, as may 
appear appropriate in the proceedings.”); see, e.g., Conley v. State, 2014 Ark. 172, at 12, 433 
S.W.3d 234, 243 (granting relief based on trial counsel’s failure to make adequate motion for 
directed verdict where evidence at trial was insufficient to support convictions on two counts 
charged in the information); State v. Harrison, 2012 Ark. 198, at 2–3, 404 S.W.3d 830, 833 
(granting relief on Rule 37 petition where trial counsel failed to investigate witness’s prior 
juvenile conviction for capital murder and impeach witness at trial). 
 132. If the petitioning defendant has been sentenced to death, the postconviction remedy 
is governed by the provisions of Rule 37.5. See ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.5. Rule 37.5 provides 
procedural framework for litigation of claims brought by death-sentenced inmates designed 
to comply with federal law, expediting the execution of death sentences imposed in state 
capital prosecutions. Id. With respect to the limitation on claims cognizable in Arkansas 
postconviction proceedings, the range of claims which may be brought in capital challenges 
parallels those generally cognizable in cases in which defendants have not been sentenced to 
death, including those who may have been charged with capital offenses but were sentenced 
to life imprisonment or lesser sentences. See ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.5(a) (“Purpose and Scope. 
This rule shall apply only to persons under a sentence of death. Except as otherwise provided 
in this rule, the provisions of Rules 37.1, 37.2, 37.3 and 37.4 shall apply to a petition for post-
conviction relief filed by a person under sentence of death. The intent of this rule is to comply 
with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2261 et seq.”). ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.5; see supra note 4 for 
text of Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1(a). 
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instance, in Sasser v. State,133 a death penalty case, the court offered its 
standard explanation with respect to the scope of appeal: 
We have previously held that even constitutional issues must be raised in 
the trial court and on direct appeal, rather than in Rule 37 proceedings. 
Finley v. State, 295 Ark. 357, 748 S.W.2d 643 (1988). Rule 37 is a post-
conviction remedy, and as such, does not provide a method for the re-
view of mere error in the conduct of the trial or to serve as a substitute 
for appeal.
134
 
The issue Sasser advanced involved an arguably flawed jury instruction 
on a lesser offense on which his capital felony murder charge rested, but 
which had not been challenged by trial counsel.135 The court’s rejection of 
the postconviction challenge reflects the general rule that Rule 37 may not 
be used to assert claims that should have been brought on direct appeal 
based on error preserved by proper objection at trial.136 The notion of proce-
dural default relied upon by the Arkansas appellate courts to avoid review of 
those claims on the merits on direct appeal thus extends to prevent litigation 
of defaulted claims in the postconviction process. The Sasser court further 
explained that the exception to this general rule of procedural default would 
apply to claims of “fundamental” or “structural error,” but this proposition 
may not actually be consistently applied by the court: 
We have made an exception, however, for errors that are so fundamental 
as to render the judgment of conviction void and subject to collateral at-
tack. In Collins, for example, we held that the right to trial by a twelve-
member jury is a fundamental right that fell within the exception. When 
we review a “fundamental” or “structural” error either on direct appeal 
or through the exception just explained, the fundamental nature of the er-
ror precludes application of the “harmless-error” analysis.137 
As explained in Wicks v. State,138 the court’s consistent rejection of “plain 
error” review139 suggests that its purported willingness to review claims of 
“fundamental” error in Sasser is quite restricted. 
 
 133. 338 Ark. 375, 993 S.W.2d 901 (1999). 
 134. Id. at 383, 993 S.W.2d at 906 (citation omitted). 
 135. Id. at 385, 993 S.W.2d at 907. 
 136. Id. at 383, 993 S.W.2d at 906. 
 137. Id. at 383–84, 993 S.W.2d at 906 (citing Collins v. State, 324 Ark. 322, 920 S.W.2d 
846 (1996)). 
 138. 270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W.2d 366 (1980). 
 139. “Plain error” review is arguably available for matters involving error in admission or 
exclusion of evidence pursuant to Arkansas Rules of Evidence 103(d), which provides, 
“Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of errors affecting substantial rights although 
they were not brought to the attention of the court.” However, in Wicks the court expressly 
rejected “plain error” review in Arkansas law. 270 Ark. at 785, 606 S.W.2d at 369 (“Some 
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For instance, in Kennedy v. State,140 the court found that the trial 
court’s failure to instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense, a right recog-
nized under state law, did not constitute a claim that could be raised in Rule 
37 as a matter of fundamental or plain error: 
Kennedy further argues that our cases have recognized the importance of 
lesser included offense instructions because we have previously held that 
the jury must be so instructed even when there is the “slightest evidence” 
to support a finding of a lesser included offense. We conclude that the 
right to have the jury instructed on all lesser included offenses supported 
by the evidence is not a fundamental right that warrants review of the 
omission of such instructions for the first time in a Rule 37 proceed-
ing.
141
 
Thus, claims that could have been raised in the trial and direct appeal pro-
cess, but were procedurally defaulted, cannot be revived in the postconvic-
tion process under Rule 37, as the State argued in Kennedy.142 
Nor can a petitioner use Rule 37 to reargue claims that were raised on 
direct appeal and rejected on their merits, except in the rare situation in 
which a change in the controlling law would have required the appellate 
court to rule differently in the appeal. Thus, in Fudge v. State,143 the court 
rejected a claim raised in postconviction that had been rejected in the su-
preme court’s disposition under Rule 4-3(h) and (i) in reviewing trial objec-
tions not argued on the direct appeal.144 It concluded that the issue had been 
decided against the petitioner on appeal as a result of the summary findings 
in its opinion: “Because this issue was settled in Fudge’s direct appeal, it is 
now the law of the case and cannot be reargued here.”145 
And in Howard v. State,146 the court rejected a claim raised in postcon-
viction that was not asserted in a petition for writ of certiorari, although it 
could have been presented to the Supreme Court of the United States based 
 
courts, especially the federal courts, have a ‘plain error’ rule, under which plain errors affect-
ing substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the 
trial court. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 52(b); State v. Meiers, 412 S.W.2d 478 
(Mo. 1967). In Arkansas, however, we do not have such a rule.”). And, with respect to Ar-
kansas Rules of Evidence 103(d), the Wicks court explained that the rule was permissive, not 
mandatory, and thus, did not require the court to consider unpreserved error. Id. at 787, 606 
S.W.2d at 370 (“If there is any other exception to our general rule that an objection must be 
made in the trial court, we have not found it in our review of our case law.”). 
 140. 338 Ark. 125, 991 S.W.2d 606 (1999). 
 141. Id. at 129, 991 S.W.2d at 609. 
 142. Id. at 128–29, 991 S.W.2d at 608. 
 143. 361 Ark. 412, 206 S.W.3d 850 (2005). 
 144. Id. at 428–30, 206 S.W.3d at 862–64. 
 145. Id. at 429, 206 S.W.3d at 863 (citing Camargo v. State, 337 Ark. 105, 987 S.W.2d 
680 (1999); Johnson v. State, 356 Ark. 534, 157 S.W.2d 151 (2004)). 
 146. 367 Ark. 18, 238 S.W.3d 24 (2006). 
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on its recent decisions.147 This suggests that the Arkansas position is that 
even newly announced decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States 
may not afford a basis for arguing claims not litigated on direct appeal. The 
Howard court explained: 
In his second point on appeal, Howard argues that, under Ring v. Arizo-
na, 536 U.S. 584 [] (2002), the information charging him with capital 
murder was defective because it failed to enumerate any of the four ag-
gravating circumstances upon which the State relied to obtain the death 
penalty.4 The two counts of information charging Howard with capital 
murder, filed in Little River County Circuit Court on December 19, 
1997, stated only that Howard was charged with committing capital 
murder “with the premeditated and deliberated purpose of causing the 
death of another person[.]” The information did not enumerate the statu-
tory aggravating factors that the State subsequently submitted to the jury.
 
As with Howard’s first argument, this is a claim that should have been 
presented on direct appeal. As the State points out, even though Ring 
was decided mere days before this court denied Howard’s petition for 
rehearing, the direct-review process encompasses certiorari proceedings. 
See Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383 [] (1994). Thus, Howard could have 
presented his Ring- and Allen-based argument in his petition for writ of 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, but he did not. According-
ly, he is barred from raising it for the first time during the course of his 
postconviction proceedings. See Williams v. State, 346 Ark. 54, 56 
S.W.3d 360 (2001) (even constitutional issues must be raised on direct 
appeal, rather than in Rule 37 proceedings).
148 
In short, the general rule is that “Rule 37 does not provide an opportunity for 
an appellant to reargue points that were settled on direct appeal. . . There-
fore, there is no merit to Howard’s arguments on this issue.”149 
Howard and other decisions confirm the position taken by the Arkansas 
Supreme Court in its view of the limitation on presentation of issues in the 
Rule 37 process: 
Generally, Rule 37 does not provide a remedy when an issue could have 
been raised in the trial or argued on appeal. See Camargo v. State, 346 
Ark. 118, 55 S.W.3d 255 (2001). Stated another way, it is not appropri-
ate to raise trial errors, including constitutional errors, for the first time 
in a Rule 37 proceeding. See Rowbottom v. State, 341 Ark. 33, 13 
 
 147. Id. at 27–28, 238 S.W.3d at 32–33. 
 148. Id., 238 S.W.3d at 32–33. 
 149. Id. at 42, 238 S.W.3d at 43 (citing Kemp v. State, 348 Ark. 750, 74 S.W.3d 224 
(2002); Coulter v. State, 343 Ark. 22, 31 S.W.3d 826 (2000)). 
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S.W.3d 904 (2000); Finley v. State, 295 Ark. 357, 748 S.W.2d 643 
(1988).
150
 
Thus, Rule 37.1 does not provide for raising issues for the first time 
that could have been litigated in the direct appeal, nor does it afford the peti-
tioner an opportunity to relitigate issues that were addressed in the direct 
appeal and decided adversely to him.151 
2. Litigating Ineffective Assistance Claims in Rule 37.1 
The practical effect of the limitations on claims cognizable in Rule 37 
proceedings imposed by the Arkansas Supreme Court is that the majority of 
claims that might result in relief arise in the context of ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims.152 These claims rest primarily on the guarantee of assis-
tance of counsel in the Sixth Amendment153 and the application of the feder-
al protection as the controlling definition of the right for Arkansas liti-
gants.154 
 
 150. Id. at 26, 238 S.W.3d at 32. 
 151. However, in State v. Harrison, the State argued, unsuccessfully, that an issue raised 
in a Rule 37 that petition had been considered on direct appeal and decided adversely to the 
petitioner was barred from reconsideration in postconviction litigation, relying on the “law of 
the case” doctrine. 2012 Ark. 198, at 7–8, 404 S.W.3d 830, 835–36. The supreme court disa-
greed. Id. at 8, 404 S.W.3d at 836. On direct appeal, Harrison argued that the prosecution 
violated its obligation to disclose favorable evidence to the defense, the juvenile adjudication 
for capital murder of its witness. Id. at 6, 404 S.W.3d at 835; see also Harrison v. State, 371 
Ark. 652, 269 S.W.3d 321 (2007). In the postconviction action, in contrast, he argued that 
trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance in failing to discover the prior adjudication, 
which had been the subject of a published decision issued by the court of appeals. Harrison, 
2012 Ark. 198, at 7, 404 S.W.3d at 835. In rejecting the State’s argument, the supreme court 
explained: 
In short, the issue that was adjudicated on direct appeal was the prosecutor’s 
conduct in failing to disclose, and the issue at the Rule 37 proceeding was the de-
fense counsel’s conduct in failing to investigate and then develop a defense. 
These are two distinct issues. The latter of these issues, trial counsel’s effective-
ness in investigating and developing a defense implicating Ingram was not adju-
dicated on direct appeal, and resolution of that issue is therefore not barred by 
law of the case. Accordingly, we find no merit to the State’s argument that the 
circuit court’s findings on the ineffectiveness of trial counsel are barred by law of 
the case. 
Id. at 8, 404 S.W.3d at 836 (emphasis added). 
 152. See, e.g., Howard v. State, 367 Ark. 18, 51, 238 S.W.3d 24, 49 (Hannah, C.J., dis-
senting) (“Rule 37 petitions most often concern issues of alleged ineffective assistance of 
counsel.”). 
 153. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment guarantee that “the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defence,” has been held to include 
the right to effective assistance of counsel. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 
(1970). 
 154. See Henington v. State, 2012 Ark. 181, at 3, 403 S.W.3d 55, 58. 
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Strickland v. Washington155 is the controlling United States Supreme 
Court decision defining the scope of the Sixth Amendment guarantee. It 
establishes a two-prong test for counsel’s constitutional effectiveness, re-
quiring first, proof that counsel rendered defective performance not reflect-
ing an objectively reasonable strategic decision, and second, reasonable 
probability that but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the case would have 
been different.156 
Other Sixth Amendment bases for violation of the guarantee to assis-
tance of counsel arise in context of conflicts of interest compromising coun-
sel’s performance, generally requiring a showing that counsel’s conflict ac-
tually compromised the client’s case under Cuyler v. Sullivan,157 and rare 
situations in which a rule or trial court ruling deprived the defendant of 
counsel’s effective assistance, such as the trial court’s ruling denying de-
fense counsel the right to make a closing statement in a bench trial.158 
In Conley v. State,159 the Arkansas Supreme Court discussed the burden 
convicted defendants must satisfy in order to establish a claim based on in-
effective assistance of counsel based on the Sixth Amendment test set by the 
Court in Strickland.160 The court explained: 
In asserting ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, the peti-
tioner first must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient. 
Williams v. State, 2011 Ark. 489, 385 S.W.3d 228. This requires a show-
ing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning 
as the “counsel” guaranteed the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment. Ad-
ams v. State, 2013 Ark. 174, 427 S.W.3d 63. The reviewing court must 
indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the 
wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Scott v. State, 2012 
Ark. 199, 406 S.W.3d 1. The defendant claiming ineffective assistance 
of counsel has the burden of overcoming that presumption by identifying 
the acts and omissions of counsel which, when viewed from counsel’s 
perspective at the time of trial, could not have been the result of reasona-
 
 155. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 156. Id. at 694. In Sparkman v. State, the court reversed the circuit court’s denial of post-
conviction relief based on trial counsel’s failure to object to admission of the accused’s un-
counseled confession, given under questioning by detective without notice to counsel already 
appointed to represent accused, constituted defective performance and noting that accused’s 
confession is “probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted 
against him.” 373 Ark. 35, 50–52, 281 S.W.3d 277, 281–83 (2008) (citing Arizona v. Ful-
minante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991)). The court concluded that Sparkman had satisfied both 
the defective performance and probable prejudice prongs of the Strickland test for ineffective 
assistance and reversed and remanded for new trial. Id. at 52, 281 S.W.3d at 283. 
 157. 446 U.S. 335, 349–50 (1980). 
 158. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 865 (1975). 
 159. 2014 Ark. 172, 433 S.W.3d 234. 
 160. Id. at 4–5, 433 S.W.3d at 239 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. 668). 
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ble professional judgment. Henington v. State, 2012 Ark. 181, 403 
S.W.3d 55. 
Second, the petitioner must show that the deficient performance preju-
diced the defense, which requires a demonstration that counsel’s errors 
were so serious as to deprive the petitioner of a fair trial.
161
 
The state supreme court has also explained that “in making a determi-
nation on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, [it] considers the total-
ity of the evidence.”162 This language would suggest that when counsel’s 
representation includes more than one instance of defective performance, 
the totality of the evidence would require the reviewing court to assess the 
cumulative effect of counsel’s errors in arriving at the determination of 
whether the defendant was afforded effective assistance. This view appar-
ently agrees with the majority of jurisdictions that have held that cumulative 
error analysis does apply to claims resting on multiple instances of counsel’s 
deficient performance.163 
However, the Arkansas Supreme Court has rejected application of cu-
mulative error in the review of ineffective assistance claims,164 a position 
also taken by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals165 and other jurisdic-
tions.166 This approach fails to recognize the repeated reference to counsel’s 
 
 161. Id., 433 S.W.3d at 239. 
 162. State v. Harrison, 2012 Ark. 198, at 4, 404 S.W.3d 830, 833. 
 163. See, e.g., James v. Warden, No. CV104003622, 2014 WL 1646974, at *28 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 2014) (noting majority of courts have applied cumulative error doctrine in 
assessing effectiveness of counsel’s assistance (citing Hooks v. Workman, 689 F.3d 1148, 
1188 (10th Cir. 2012); Richards v. Quarterman, 566 F.3d 553, 564 (5th Cir. 2007); Dugas v. 
Coplan, 428 F.3d 317, 335 (1st Cir. 2005); Lindstadt v. Keane, 239 F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir. 
2001); Harris By & Through Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995); Kubat 
v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 351, 370 (7th Cir. 1989); Suggs v. State, 923 So.2d 419, 441 (Fla. 2005); 
Schofield v. Holsley, 642 S.E.2d 56, 60 n.1 (Ga. 2007); State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488, 500 
(Iowa 2012); Evans v. State, 28 P.3d 498, 524 (Nev. 2001); Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 
A.3d 121, 161 (Pa. 2012); State v. Thiel, 665 N.W.2d 305, 321 (Wis. 2003))). 
 164. E.g., Parks v. State, 301 Ark. 513, 515, 785 S.W.2d 213, 215 (1990). 
 165. Middleton v. Roper, 455 F.3d 838, 851 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that defendant may 
not build constitutional claim on series of counsel’s errors). 
 166. See Fisher v. Angelone, 163 F.3d 835, 852 (4th Cir.1998) (“To the extent this [c]ourt 
has not specifically stated that ineffective assistance of counsel claims, like claims of trial 
court error, must be reviewed individually, rather than collectively, we do so now.”). The 
Fisher court reviewed the positions taken by other circuits: 
For example, in Wainwright v. Lockhart, 80 F.3d 1226 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
519 U.S. 968 [] (1996), the Eighth Circuit expressly held that an attorney’s acts 
or omissions “that are not unconstitutional individually cannot be added together 
to create a constitutional violation.” Id. at 1233; see also Jones v. Stotts, 59 F.3d 
143, 147 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that cumulative-error analysis evaluates only 
effect of matters determined to be error, not cumulative effect of non-errors); 
United States v. Stewart, 20 F.3d 911, 917–18 (8th Cir. 1994) (same); United 
States v. Gutierrez, 995 F.2d 169, 173 (9th Cir. 1993) (same). But see Williams v. 
352 UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
 
“errors” in the opinion in Strickland.167 Arguably, then, Arkansas fails to 
apply the proper standard for review of ineffective assistance claims. 
A significant part of the problem for petitioners asserting ineffective 
assistance claims is the clear tendency of the state supreme court to defer to 
counsel’s exercise of judgment in resolving claims of defective perfor-
mance.168 For instance, even in a capital case in which the death sentence 
had been imposed,169 Wertz v. State,170 the court explained: “[W]ith respect 
to an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim regarding the decision of trial 
counsel to call a witness, such matters are generally trial strategy and out-
side the purview of Rule 37.1.”171 
 
Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that “a petitioner may 
demonstrate that the cumulative effect of counsel’s individual acts or omissions 
was [prejudicial]”); Rodriguez v. Hoke, 928 F.2d 534, 538 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting 
that a “claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can turn on the cumulative ef-
fect of all of counsel’s actions”). 
Id. at 852–53. 
 167. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 678–79, 682, 693–96 (1984). 
 168. See Slater v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 499, at 4, 533 S.W.3d 84, 88 (citing Rose v. 
State, 2017 Ark. App. 355, 526 S.W.3d 11). 
 169. In capital cases in which the petitioner has been sentenced to death, the postconvic-
tion petition proceeds pursuant to Rule 37.5, not 37.1. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.5. Because a death 
sentence has been imposed, the appeal from denial of relief proceeds directly to the state 
supreme court. McGehee v. State, 344 Ark. 602, 604, 43 S.W.3d 125, 126 (2001) (explaining 
that supreme court jurisdiction for defendant sentenced to death is pursuant to Rule 37 of the 
Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure and Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1-2(a)(8)). 
 170. 2014 Ark. 240, 434 S.W.3d 895. 
 171. Id. at 4, 434 S.W.3d at 900 (emphasis added). Note that the court referenced “Rule 
37.1,” in explaining its position on trial counsel’s exercise of discretion, rather than “Rule 
37.5.” Id., 434 S.W.3d at 900. Rule 37.5(a), however, explains: “This rule shall apply only to 
persons under a sentence of death. Except as otherwise provided in this rule, the provisions of 
Rules 37.1, 37.2, 37.3 and 37.4 shall apply to a petition for post-conviction relief filed by a 
person under sentence of death.” ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.5(a). Section (a), thus, provides that 
only the specific procedural requirements of Rule 37.5 for death penalty cases are unique to 
capital prosecutions, such that principles of law apply in capital cases in which defendants 
have been sentenced to death and those in which death was not imposed and non-capital 
cases with equal force. Id. However, Criminal Appellate Rule 10 expressly provides for dif-
ferent standards for appellate review in cases in which a sentence of death has been imposed 
but applies to review on direct appeal. ARK. R. APP. P.—CRIM. 10. For instance, two provi-
sions appear to require the review of error regardless of preservation by trial objection: 
(b) Mandatory Review. Whenever a sentence of death is imposed, the Supreme 
Court shall review the following issues in addition to other issues, if any, that a 
defendant may enumerate on appeal. Counsel shall be responsible for abstracting 
the record and briefing the issues required to be reviewed by this rule and shall 
consolidate the abstract and brief for such issues and any other issues enumerated 
on appeal. The Court shall consider and determine: 
. . . 
(iv) whether the trial court failed in its obligation to intervene without objection 
to correct a serious error by admonition or declaring a mistrial; 
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With respect to the specific reassignment of appellate jurisdiction in 
Barnes, however, one obvious problem is that while the court redirected 
cases to the court of appeals in which claims of ineffective assistance have 
been asserted, Arkansas cases demonstrate that claims other than those al-
leging ineffective assistance remain cognizable under Rule 37. For example, 
in Pardue v. State,172 the court noted: 
At the postconviction-relief hearing, appellant Pardue waived the argu-
ments in his pro se petition asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Counsel’s arguments presented at the hearing asserted appellant lacked 
the capacity to intelligently and voluntarily enter a guilty plea, or that the 
pleading procedure was defective. Appellant raises four points for rever-
sal: (1) use of prescription medications rendered his plea invalid; (2) his 
plea was not knowing and voluntary because the conditions were not 
clearly stated and assented to on the record; (3) his plea was void be-
cause he was not asked and did not assent to the factual basis; (4) sen-
tencing as a habitual offender should be void because the state failed to 
charge appellant as a habitual offender or because the trial court failed to 
fully advise appellant or require a factual basis.
173
 
This recitation of claims brought in a Rule 37 petition show that the remedy 
is not limited to arguments that counsel failed to provide effective assistance 
but may include other grounds for attacking the conviction or sentence im-
posed by the trial court. 
Under the limited directive in the Barnes footnote, it could be argued 
that the claim should be properly presented to the Arkansas Supreme Court 
because it is not restricted to ineffective assistance allegations. However, the 
supreme court’s decision to simply change appellate jurisdiction for these 
claims by footnote, rather than by published order, leaves unexplained the 
full extent of appellate jurisdiction redirected to the court of appeals in the 
Barnes footnote. Still, that this might remain an unresolved issue is suggest-
ed by Judge Whiteaker’s opinion for the court in which he referred to the 
 
(v) whether the trial court erred in failing to take notice of an evidentiary error 
that affected a substantial right of the defendant; 
Id. 
The requirements imposed upon review of capital cases in which a death sentence has been 
imposed by the Arkansas Supreme Court itself in its adoption of Criminal Appellate Rule 
10(b)(iv) and (v) suggest nothing less than recognition of a rule of plain or fundamental error 
in those cases, contrary to the general approach taken by the court in Wicks v. State, 270 Ark. 
781, 785, 606 S.W.2d 366, 369 (1980). But the decisions in Sasser v. State, 338 Ark. 375, 
993 S.W.2d 901 (1999) and Howard v. State, 367 Ark. 18, 238 S.W.3d 24 (2006), do not 
support any conclusion that Rule 10 requires the court to overrule its previous position gener-
ally rejecting review of unpreserved error. 
 172. 363 Ark. 567, 215 S.W.3d 650 (2005). 
 173. Id. at 569–70, 215 S.W.3d at 653. 
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Arkansas Supreme Court’s transfer of a majority of its Rule 37 appellate 
jurisdiction to the Arkansas Court of Appeals.174 
D. Other Postconviction Remedies Under Arkansas Law 
There are at least four other procedural vehicles for convicted criminal 
defendants seeking relief from their convictions or sentences, each based on 
discrete theories of violations compromising their substantial rights. Ironi-
cally, perhaps in light of the position taken in the footnote to the Court’s 
order in Barnes, the appeal in each of these procedural remedies lies in the 
Arkansas Supreme Court.175 This may be consistent with the underlying 
thinking in Rule 1-2(a), which provides that the supreme court has appellate 
jurisdiction in actions involving extraordinary relief, “quo warranto, prohibi-
tion, injunction, or mandamus directed to the state, county, or municipal 
officials or to circuit courts.”176 The remedies involved in collateral attacks 
on criminal judgments are not included in this list but are, in a real sense, 
extraordinary because they operate outside the regular course of civil and 
criminal litigation. 
The four alternative remedies are briefly summarized below.177 
1. Statutory Attack on an Illegal Sentence 
Section 16-90-111 of the Arkansas Code Annotated provides a remedy 
for imposition of an illegal sentence, rather than a sentence illegally im-
posed, brought in the trial court of conviction.178 This remedy overlaps the 
provisions in Rule 37.1(a)(ii) and (a)(iii).179 While the state supreme court 
has held that a challenge to illegal imposition of sentence is only cognizable 
in a Rule 37.1 action, it continues to recognize that facially illegal sentences 
may still be brought pursuant to section 16-90-111.180 Rule 37.1 would also 
 
 174. Bridgeman v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 321, at 3–4, 525 S.W.3d 459, 462. 
 175. E.g., Flowers v. Norris, 347 Ark. 760, 762, 68 S.W.3d 289, 290 (2002) (“An appeal 
is the proper procedure for the review of a circuit court’s denial of a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus.”). 
 176. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(a)(3). 
 177. See infra Sections III.D.1–4. 
 178. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-111 (West 2019). 
 179. Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1(a) provides, in pertinent parts: 
(a) A petitioner in custody under sentence of a circuit court claiming a right to be 
released, or to have a new trial, or to have the original sentence modified on the 
ground: 
. . . 
(ii) that the court imposing the sentence was without jurisdiction to do so; or 
(iii) that the sentence was in excess of the maximum sentence authorized by law; 
 180. Thompson v. State, 2016 Ark. 380, at 1, 2016 WL 6518511, at *1–2; Halfacre v. 
State, 2015 Ark. 105, at 2–3, 460 S.W.3d 282, 284 (per curiam). 
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afford the petitioner the option of raising a challenge to the legality of the 
sentence imposed by postconviction petition within the time limits imposed 
by the rule, according to the text of subsections (b) and (c). In contrast, there 
is no time limit for filing the claim under section 16-90-111.181 The petition 
to correct an illegal sentence must be filed in the circuit court of conviction, 
as the court explained in Wesley v. Kelley:182 
A petition under section 16-90-111 is a request for postconviction relief 
from a judgment of conviction; as such, it is properly filed in the trial 
court where the judgment was entered under the docket number for the 
criminal judgment being challenged.
183
 
The court also explained that the petition should name the State as the de-
fendant, rather than the Director of the Arkansas Department of Correc-
tion.184 
2. Attack on Illegal Sentence by Statutory Writ of Habeas Corpus 
Second, where a trial court acts outside or in excess of its jurisdiction, 
the defendant may, alternatively, challenge the action by petitioning for ha-
beas corpus relief, pursuant to section 16-112-101.185 The most common 
claim that warrants relief is based on imposition of a conviction or sentence 
by the circuit court not authorized by statute, most typically a sentence im-
 
 181. Green v. State, 2017 Ark. 361, at 2 n.1, 533 S.W.3d 81, 82 n.1; Gardner v. State, 
2017 Ark. 230, at 2, 2017 WL 3300528, at *2. 
 182. 2017 Ark. 194, 519 S.W.3d 693. 
 183. Id. at 2 n.2, 519 S.W.3d at 695 n.1. 
 184. Id. at 2, 519 S.W.3d at 695. The more recent decision in Board of Trustees of the 
University of Arkansas v. Andrews, 2018 Ark. 12, 585 S.W.3d 616, may ultimately bear on 
reliance on section 16-90-111 as a procedural vehicle for challenging illegal sentences. The 
court held that the Arkansas constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes actions 
against the State in state courts except in limited circumstances. Id. at 3–6, 585 S.W.3d at 
619–20. Justice Baker, joined by Justice Hart, dissenting, suggests that “postconviction cas-
es” could fall within the ambit of the constitutional prohibition of actions against the State as 
a party. Id. at 18–19, 585 S.W.3d at 627. Andrews would appear to reject the court’s decision 
in Lenard v. Kelley, 2017 Ark. 186, at 6, 519 S.W.3d 682, 688, in which the court described 
those circumstances in which an action against the State, or naming the State as a defendant, 
is not precluded by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. However, the court rendered a deci-
sion in Lukach v. State, 2018 Ark. 208, 548 S.W.3d 810, issued on June 7, 2018, six months 
after the decision in Andrews, which was issued on January 18, 2018. Lukach was an action 
brought under section 16-90-111, suggesting that the concern originally expressed by Justice 
Baker in Andrews, has impliedly been addressed by the supreme court in ruling on the merits 
in this action naming the State as party defendant. Id. at 4, 548 S.W.3d at 812. 
 185. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-101 (West 2019). The writ of habeas corpus is designed 
to protect the individual from illegal confinement as a result of action taken by public offi-
cials or actors. Meny v. Norris, 340 Ark. 418, 422–23, 13 S.W.3d 143, 146. The state consti-
tution expressly provides that the writ shall not be suspended. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 11. 
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posed beyond the trial court’s statutory authority.186 This claim is similar to 
that available under section 16-90-111, but the petition is filed in the circuit 
having physical jurisdiction over the petitioner because of his place of con-
finement,187 rather than in the trial court of conviction.188 
The habeas court’s jurisdiction is not limited to claims based on facial-
ly-defective judgments, those in which the sentence reflected in the judg-
ment and commitment order is outside the trial court’s jurisdiction. In 
Gardner v. Hobbs,189 the court held that the burden is on the petitioner con-
testing: “A writ of habeas corpus is proper only when a judgment of convic-
tion is invalid on its face or when a trial court lacked jurisdiction over the 
cause.”190 
Even though the circuit court may be within its discretion in imposing 
punishment in accordance with the controlling statute, subsequent action 
may serve to require relief from a sentence lawful at the time it was im-
posed, as the Arkansas Supreme Court’s disposition in Jackson v. Norris,191 
 
 186. For instance, in Flowers v. Norris, the court held that an illegal sentence claim im-
plicates jurisdictional error which cannot be waived and can be asserted on direct appeal or in 
a petition for habeas corpus without having been preserved by timely objection in the trial 
court. 347 Ark. 760, 763–64, 68 S.W.3d 289, 291–92 (2002). While the court denied relief on 
the claim asserted, it did modify the sentence imposed in the case where the trial court im-
properly imposed a concurrent sentence of forty years on a Class A felony on one of the 
charges on which Flowers had been convicted on his plea of guilty, reducing that sentence to 
the thirty year maximum punishment for attempted capital murder. Id. at 767, 68 S.W.3d at 
293 
 187. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-105(b)(1) (West 2019). As with Rule 37.1 claims, the 
circuit court only has jurisdiction if the petitioner is actually confined pursuant to the illegal 
sentence. In State v. Wilmoth, for example, the Court noted that Wilmoth had been released 
from custody two years before he filed for relief. 369 Ark. 346, 351, 255 S.W.3d 419, 422 
(2007). Similarly, in Pardue v. State, the petitioner was confined on a federal conviction, 
rather than on the basis of a state conviction, at the time he filed his habeas petition, having 
already discharged the state sentence. 363 Ark. 567, 215 S.W.3d 650 (2005). And in Brad-
ford v. State, the Court explained that because the conviction the petitioner challenged as 
illegally resulting in his confinement had been reversed on appeal and dismissed, he could 
not support a valid habeas corpus claim. 2011 Ark. 494, at 5, 2011 WL 5588934, at *3. His 
claim that he was illegally confined was rejected because Arkansas Department of Correc-
tions records showed that he was actually serving three other sentences, including a life sen-
tence, on other offenses on which he had been convicted. Id. at 1–2, 2011 WL 5588934, at 
*1. 
 188. E.g., Wesley v. Hobbs, 2014 Ark. 260, at 2, 2014 WL 2465503, at *1 (“Appellant’s 
petition to correct the sentence that was imposed in Nevada County was filed in the wrong 
court because the circuit court in Lee County had no jurisdiction to consider the petition to 
correct a judgment of conviction that had not been entered in Lee County. While the statute 
refers to ‘any circuit court,’ it is the court where the judgment was entered that has authority 
to act under Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-111.” (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-
90-111 (West 2019))). 
 189. 2014 Ark. 346, 469 S.W.3d 663. 
 190. Id. at 2, 469 S.W.3d at 669 (emphasis added). 
 191. 2013 Ark. 175, 426 S.W.3d 906. 
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demonstrates. There, the life sentence without parole mandatorily imposed 
under Arkansas law was invalidated for the juvenile offender by the Su-
preme Court of the United States in Miller v. Alabama,192 and the compan-
ion case of Jackson v. Hobbs,193 which originated in the Arkansas courts.194 
On remand from the Court’s decision, the state court reversed the denial of 
habeas corpus relief, applying the decision in Miller/Jackson retroactive-
ly,195 and by implication, finding that the circuit court’s imposition of the 
mandatory life sentence without possibility of parole was beyond the scope 
of its lawful authority.196 
Finally, although the state habeas corpus statute provides that the peti-
tioner has the option of filing the petition directly in the state supreme 
court,197 Amendment 80 to the state constitution subsequently limited the 
court’s original jurisdiction to specific actions that do not include habeas 
corpus actions.198 
3. Statutory Habeas Corpus Claims of Actual Innocence 
Third, a defendant claiming actual innocence may seek testing for ex-
culpatory DNA or other scientific evidence by writ of habeas corpus under a 
separate statutory provision.199 The statutory process for raising an actual 
innocence claim is complicated, requiring the defendant to demonstrate that 
the scientific evidence, upon which the claim is based, is either newly dis-
covered or newly available scientific evidence200 that would be sufficiently 
exculpatory “to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasona-
ble fact-finder would find the petitioner guilty of the underlying offense.”201 
Critical to the defendant’s right to testing under the statutory scheme is a 
showing that the scientific evidence would address an issue at trial, such as 
 
 192. 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
 193. 565 U.S. 1013 (2012). 
 194. Jackson, 2013 Ark. 175, at 2, 426 S.W.3d at 907. 
 195. Id. at 6, 426 S.W.3d at 909–11. 
 196. Id. at 2, 426 S.W.3d at 907. 
 197. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-102(a)(1) (West 2019) (“The writ of habeas corpus shall 
be issued upon proper application by a Justice of the Supreme Court or a judge of the circuit 
court. The power of the Supreme Court and circuit court to issue writs of habeas corpus shall 
be coextensive with the state.”). 
 198. ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 2. 
 199. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-201 (West 2019). 
 200. Id. § 16-112-201(a)(1) (referring to scientific evidence not available at the time of 
trial). 
 201. The statutory test for obtaining relief requires that the scientific evidence was not 
available at the time of trial and “if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole,” 
the evidence would be sufficient to meet the clear and convincing evidence test. Id. § 16-112-
201 (a)(2). 
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the perpetrator’s identity, upon which a doubt as to guilt could logically 
rest.202 
4. Writ of Error Coram Nobis 
Finally, the writ of error coram nobis permits a defendant to petition 
for leave to raise claims outside the trial record. In Mason v. State,203 the 
Arkansas Supreme Court explained: 
The function of the writ is to secure relief from a judgment rendered 
while there existed some fact that would have prevented its rendition if it 
had been known to the trial court and which, through no negligence or 
fault of the defendant, was not brought forward before rendition of 
judgment.
204
 
Moreover, relief by writ of error coram nobis is available for only certain 
specified claims of such significance that relief is required to prevent injus-
tice, as the court explained in Penn v. State:205 
The writ is granted only when there is an error of fact extrinsic to the 
record such as insanity at the time of trial, a coerced plea of guilty, or 
material evidence withheld by the prosecutor. It must be a fact which 
might have resulted in a different verdict. In simple terms, this writ is a 
legal procedure to fill a gap in the legal system—to provide relief that 
was not available at trial because a fact exists which was not known at 
that time and relief is not available on appeal because it is not in the rec-
ord.
206
 
Importantly, coram nobis affords the convicted defendant the proce-
dural option of presenting a claim that the conviction was tainted when the 
prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, as required by the Su-
preme Court of the United States in Brady v. Maryland 207 and subsequent 
 
 202. Wells v. State, 2017 Ark. 88, at 6, 513 S.W.3d 834, 837. At trial the defendant ar-
gued that the evidence failed to show he intended to kill, and thus, that the evidence was 
insufficient to support a conviction for attempted murder because he did not know the victim 
and only fired randomly. Id., 513 S.W.3d at 837. Because he had not claimed that he was not 
the individual who fired, his identity was not in issue and the court rejected his claim that the 
trial court abused its discretion in refusing to order DNA testing. Id., 513 S.W.3d at 837. The 
supreme court concluded: “A request for DNA testing raised now to assert a claim of actual 
innocence would not produce new material evidence that would support Wells’s theory of 
defense presented at trial, nor would it raise a reasonable probability that he did not commit 
the offense, particularly in light of his confession to the contrary.” Id., 513 S.W.3d at 837. 
 203. 2014 Ark. 288, 436 S.W.3d 469. 
 204. Id. at 2, 436 S.W.3d at 471. 
 205. 282 Ark. 571, 670 S.W.2d 426 (1984). 
 206. Id. at 573–74, 670 S.W.2d at 428. 
 207. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
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Brady decisions;208 when the defendant was insane at the time of trial;209 
when his guilty plea was coerced;210 or when a third party confesses to the 
crime while the defendant’s conviction is pending on appeal.211 
A showing that evidence favorable to the defense was suppressed, or 
not disclosed while in the possession or under control of the prosecutor or 
members of the prosecution team, may be the subject of extraordinary relief 
by writ of error coram nobis only if the Arkansas Supreme Court orders 
jurisdiction reinvested in the trial court to consider the claim on its merits if 
the case has been appealed.212 If the defendant has been convicted on a plea 
of guilty, however, the writ may be filed directly in the trial court because 
that court never lost jurisdiction since there was no appeal.213 Coram nobis is 
 
 208. E.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 285 n.27 (1999) (where prosecutor relies on 
open file policy arguably disclosing all evidence known to State is available to the defense, 
the defendant is not charged with duty to make an additional search for undisclosed evidence 
favorable to defense); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436–37 (1995) (undisclosed favorable 
evidence must be considered cumulatively in determining whether there was a reasonable 
probability of a different outcome had all favorable evidence been disclosed to defense); 
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 668 (1985) (material impeachment evidence must be 
disclosed to defense); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (no duty for defense 
counsel to make request for specific evidence not known to defendant because of the disclo-
sure duty imposed upon prosecutor). 
 209. See Hydrick v. State, 104 Ark. 43, 45, 148 S.W. 541, 541–42 (1912) (citing Johnson 
v. State, 97 Ark. 131, 133 S.W. 596 (1911)). More recently, in Graham v. State, the court 
held that an allegation that the petitioner was incompetent at the time he entered his plea of 
guilty is cognizable in coram nobis, but may not be raised under the habeas corpus remedy 
for newly discovered scientific evidence supporting a claim of actual innocence under Arkan-
sas Code Annotated sections 16-112-201 to -203. 358 Ark. 296, 298, 188 S.W.3d 893, 895 
(2004). 
 210. The Arkansas Supreme Court has distinguished between a claim based on coercion 
of a defendant’s guilty plea, cognizable in coram nobis, and a challenge to the conviction on a 
guilty plea based upon counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to properly advise the pleading 
defendant with respect to the consequences of pleading guilty. The former situation may 
warrant relief if the defendant was actually threatened harm into pleading guilty or his guilty 
plea was entered under fear or duress, according to White v. State, 2015 Ark. 151, at 5, 460 
S.W.3d 285, 288. But where the allegation rests on a claim that counsel failed to advise the 
defendant pleading guilty correctly, the claim is actually a postconviction attack on the con-
viction that must be brought in Rule 37. Id., 460 S.W.3d at 288–89. In Thacker v. State, the 
court also explained, “Claims of coercion cognizable in error coram nobis proceedings in-
clude pleas that are the result of fear, duress, or threats of mob violence.” 2016 Ark. 315, at 6, 
500 S.W.3d 736, 740. 
 211. Penn v. State, 282 Ark. 571, 573–74, 670 S.W.2d 426, 427–29. 
 212. Newman v. State, 2009 Ark. 539, at 5, 364 S.W.3d 61, 65. The court specifically 
applied the test for establishing a Brady violation in the context of a petition to reinvest the 
trial court with jurisdiction to consider Newman’s petition for writ of error coram nobis. Id. at 
18–19, 364 S.W.3d at 71. 
 213. Noble v. State, 2015 Ark. 141, at 5, 460 S.W.3d 774, 778. 
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a judicial remedy,214 recently expanded by decisions in Strawhacker v. 
State215 and Pitts v. State,216 in which the supreme court held that disclosure 
by the FBI that criminalists testifying as experts had testified falsely in some 
trials, warranted review by the trial courts in those cases to determine 
whether false expert testimony compromised in the integrity of the convic-
tions.217 
These decisions expand the underlying premise for the remedy because 
they recognize that the remedy may lead to evidence demonstrating a consti-
tutional non-disclosure violation, even though the petitioner remains unable 
to present evidence establishing the suppression or non-disclosure of evi-
dence that would have been favorable to the defense.218 Even if the petition-
er is able to demonstrate the undisclosed evidence would have been favora-
ble to the petitioner in developing or supporting a defense at trial, the peti-
tioner may not be entitled to relief from the conviction. The required show-
ing for relief mirrors that for Brady violations as a matter of federal constitu-
tional law. Relief from the conviction depends upon a showing that there 
would have been a reasonable probability of a different outcome had the 
undisclosed or suppressed evidence been available to the defendant at tri-
al.219 
Procedurally, the most significant aspect of the coram nobis process is 
that once the trial court has lost jurisdiction over the case after the time for 
motion for new trial or notice of appeal—thirty days—has expired, the peti-
tioner seeking review of claims cognizable in coram nobis must petition the 
Arkansas Supreme Court for leave to reinvest jurisdiction in the circuit 
 
 214. For the history of the writ of coram nobis in Arkansas, see John H. Haley, Coram 
Nobis and the Convicted Innocent, 9 ARK. L. REV. 118 (1955). The coram nobis remedy is 
criticized in Doug Ward, Post Conviction Remedies in Arkansas: What’s a Lawyer to Do?, 
28 ARK. LAW. 23, 25 (1994) (“This remedy is little used because it is rarely useful.”). For an 
extensive discussion of the current state of the coram nobis remedy in Arkansas, see J. 
Thomas Sullivan, Brady-Based Prosecution Misconduct Claims, Buckley, and the Arkansas 
Coram Nobis Remedy, 64 ARK. L. REV. 561, 610–45 (2011). The discussion includes a thor-
ough comparison of the Rule 37 and coram nobis remedies under state law. Id. 
 215. 2015 Ark. 263, 2015 WL 352639. 
 216. 2016 Ark. 345, 501 S.W.3d 803. 
 217. Id. at 3–4, 501 S.W.3d at 805–06; Strawhacker, 2015 Ark. 263, at 1–2, 2015 WL 
352639, at *1. 
 218. For example, in Buckley v. State, the petitioner learned that state law enforcement 
officers had videotaped an interview with the confidential informant prior to trial. No. CR 01-
644, 2007 WL 2955980, at *4 (Ark. Oct. 11, 2007). The videotape had never been disclosed 
because the drug agents themselves concluded that the videotape contained no exculpatory 
evidence requiring disclosure. Id. Buckley petitioned for coram nobis, but because the vide-
otape had not been disclosed, he was unable to show that it did contain evidence warranting 
relief. Id. (“Although petitioner’s attempts to obtain the tape demonstrate diligence in pursu-
ing this issue, he does not present a claim that is meritorious.”). 
 219. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435–37 (1995). 
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court.220 If the supreme court grants the petitioner’s motion, the petition for 
coram nobis relief can be presented to the trial court. If the trial court orders 
relief, the State may appeal; if relief is denied on the petition, the petitioner 
can appeal to the supreme court. 
IV. PROCEDURAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE SHIFT IN RULE 37.1 APPELLATE 
JURISDICTION 
The shift in appellate jurisdiction in Rule 37.1 appeals, ordered in the 
Barnes footnote, redirecting review of the trial court’s denial of relief from 
the Arkansas Supreme Court to the Arkansas Court of Appeals, results in a 
significant additional option, and burden, for state inmates challenging their 
convictions. The general framework for appellate review in Rule 37.1 ac-
tions imposes a duty on postconviction litigants to petition the Arkansas 
Supreme Court to review cases in which the court of appeals has ruled ad-
versely on the claims. 
A. The Additional Step in the Appellate Process: The Petition for Re-
view221 
Pursuant to the rules governing the direct appeal process under Arkan-
sas law, a petitioner, losing in the court of appeals, has the options of peti-
tioning for rehearing in that court,222 or petitioning for review of the case in 
 
 220. Mason v. State, 2014 Ark. 288, at 1, 436 S.W.3d 469, 470. 
 221. On March 14, 2019, the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted new rules that alter the 
process for filing the petition for review in the state supreme court to review a decision ren-
dered by the Arkansas Court of Appeals. In re Electronic Filing of Petitions for Rehearing & 
Petitions for Review, 2019 Ark. 79, ___ S.W.3d ___. Either party losing in the intermediate 
court may petition the supreme court for reconsideration the issues urged by the losing party. 
Id., ___ S.W.3d ___. If the petition for review filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 2-4 is 
granted, the court traditionally reviews the issue on which review has been granted de novo, 
rather than reviewing the decision of the court of appeals for error. The revised rule permits a 
losing party to file the petition for review within ten days of the denial of a petition for re-
hearing when the party has petitioned the court of appeals for rehearing. Id., ___ S.W.3d ___. 
Alternatively, in the event the losing party does not petition for rehearing in the court of 
appeals, the additional ten-day filing period commences when the time for filing the petition 
for rehearing has run, eighteen days from the issuance of the decision by the court of appeals. 
See id., ___ S.W.3d ___. 
 222. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 2-3. Under Rule 2-3(a), the losing litigant in the court of appeals 
has eighteen calendar days from the date of decision to file a petition for rehearing. ARK. SUP. 
CT. R. 2-3(a). Under subsection (g), the “petition for rehearing should be used to call atten-
tion to specific errors of law or fact which the opinion is thought to contain.” ARK. SUP. CT. 
R. 2-3(g). The rehearing process is not designed to simply reassert the argument on appeal, 
although it may certainly point to the court’s failure to properly consider precedent. See 
White v. State, No. CR 07-312, 2007 WL 4261535, at *1 (Ark. Dec. 6, 2007) (“A petition for 
rehearing should be used to call attention to specific errors of law or fact which the opinion is 
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the state supreme court.223 This means that the redirection of the appeal from 
denial of relief in a Rule 37 postconviction action transforms the process 
from a one-step appeal to a two-step appeal, with the latter being a discre-
tionary step in which the supreme court will exercise its discretion in decid-
ing whether to review the case.224 
 
thought to contain and not to repeat arguments already considered and rejected by this court. 
Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 2-3(g).”). Counsel may not use the petition to assert new claims or issues not 
presented to the court in the opening appellate brief, e.g., Pannell v. State, 320 Ark. 390, 897 
S.W.2d 552 (1995), but counsel arguably could assert the impact of an intervening decision 
or rule issued by a higher court that should serve to change the disposition on appeal by re-
hearing. 
 223. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 2-4. A party losing in the court of appeals may petition for review 
in the state supreme court either with filing for rehearing or without petitioning for rehearing 
in the court of appeals. Id. Under the revised rule, the losing party may file the petition for 
review simultaneously with the petition for rehearing or within ten days after the court of 
appeals rules on the rehearing petition or the date on which the petition for rehearing was due 
to be filed in the court of appeals. In re Electronic Filing of Petitions for Rehearing & Peti-
tions for Review, 2019 Ark. 79, ___ S.W.3d ___. 
The petition for review must be based on one of the following grounds set forth in Rule 2-
4(c): 
A petition for review must allege one of the following: (i) the case was decided 
in the Court of Appeals by a tie vote, (ii) the Court of Appeals rendered a deci-
sion which is in conflict with a prior holding of a published opinion of either the 
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, or (iii) the Court of Appeals otherwise 
erred with respect to one of the grounds listed in Rule 1-2(b). 
ARK. SUP. CT. R. 2-4(c). The grounds on which the petition for review may be urged include 
the following: 
(1) issues of first impression, 
(2) issues upon which there is a perceived inconsistency in the decisions of the 
Court of Appeals or Supreme Court, 
(3) issues involving federal constitutional interpretation, 
(4) issues of substantial public interest, 
(5) significant issues needing clarification or development of the law, or overrul-
ing of precedent, and 
(6) appeals involving substantial questions of law concerning the validity, con-
struction, or interpretation of an act of the General Assembly, ordinance of a mu-
nicipality or county, or a rule or regulation of any court, administrative agency, 
or regulatory body. 
ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(b). 
 224. Unlike the process used in other jurisdictions, once the supreme court elects to take a 
case for review on appeal, it approaches the issues raised de novo, rather than engaging in a 
review of the decision rendered by the court of appeals for error. Castaneda v. Progressive 
Classic Ins. Co., 357 Ark. 345, 350, 166 S.W.3d 556, 560 (2004) (“When this court grants a 
petition for review of a decision by the court of appeals, we review the appeal as if it had 
been originally filed in this court.”). However, in Scissom v. State, the court cited Castaneda 
for the usual proposition, but did so in language suggesting that it actually was reviewing the 
decision of the intermediate court: 
Appellee, the State of Arkansas, petitions for review from a court of appeals’ de-
cision to reverse and remand the Pope County Circuit Court’s order that extend-
ed appellant’s probation by ordering him to serve twelve months in the Regional 
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For the pro se petitioner, this second layer of review means that a sec-
ond pleading must be prepared and filed in the state supreme court within an 
eighteen-day period, or within ten days following time for filing a petition 
for rehearing or disposition on a petition for review by the Arkansas court of 
appeals,225 in order to completely exhaust the process of appellate review in 
the Arkansas system.226 This time frame may prove particularly troubling 
because the petitioner will be incarcerated in the Department of Correction, 
perhaps resulting in limited access to the library resources, which may be 
necessary in order to frame the grounds urged in the petition for review and 
administrative delays in use of the postal system. 
There is an additional consideration for pro se petitioners, as well as 
those represented by counsel. Under Rule 2-4(a), the petition for review 
“may be typewritten and shall not exceed three 8 ½” x 11”, double-spaced 
pages in length.”227 This extreme limitation on the length of the petition im-
poses a significant burden of framing the issues in terms of the brevity de-
manded by the supreme court, particularly if multiple colorable issues have 
been urged in the direct appeal and rejected by the court of appeals. The 
burden is eased, to some extent, by the express provision in Rule 2-4(b), 
which permits the party petitioning for review to attach a copy of a petition 
for rehearing by the court of appeals to the three-page petition for review.228 
The petition for rehearing is limited by Rule 2-3(e)229 to ten pages, “includ-
ing the style of the case and certificate of counsel.”230 Consequently, a liti-
gant filing a petition for review may expand upon the three page limitation 
 
Punishment Facility as an additional condition of probation, with credit to be 
given for time already served. See Scissom v. State, 94 Ark. App. 452, 232 
S.W.3d 502 (2006). We granted the State’s petition for review pursuant to Ark. 
Sup. Ct. R. 2-4(e) and (f)(2006). We affirm the court of appeals’ decision for re-
sentencing, and we reverse and remand to the circuit court for sentencing under 
the proper statutes. 
367 Ark. 368, 368, 240 S.W.3d 100, 101 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 225. For discussion of new rule regarding time for filing petition for review, see supra 
note 223. 
 226. The rule governing the issuance of the court’s mandate following the conclusion of 
an appeal likely must be amended to reflect the reassignment of appellate jurisdiction in Rule 
37.1 actions to the court of appeals. See ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(h), Reporter’s Notes (2001) 
(referring to the exhaustion of state remedies in the context of subsequent federal habeas 
corpus petitions and stating that “the exhaustion doctrine, in other words, turns on an inquiry 
into what procedures are ‘available’ under state law”). 
 227. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 2-4(a). However, any party may request leave of the supreme court 
to file a supplemental brief pursuant to Rule 2-4(f) once the court grants a petition to review 
the case. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 2-4(f). 
 228. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 2-4(b). 
 229. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 2-3(e). 
 230. The “certificate of counsel” refers to the statement that the petition for rehearing is 
not filed for purposes of delay. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 2-3(a). Presumably, a pro se filing must 
include a similar certificate. 
364 UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
 
for the petition for review by simultaneously filing, within the applicable 
time period for filing either pleading, by attaching a copy of the petition for 
rehearing to the petition for review. For the pro se litigant, however, this 
process may not only be confusing, but also involve some considerable dif-
ficulty because it entails the filing of both the rehearing and review peti-
tions. 
B. Appointment of Counsel in the Postconviction Process 
For those inmates represented by counsel, who may, in fact, be ap-
pointed by the circuit court to represent an indigent petitioner,231 a different 
question raised by the change in appellate jurisdiction remains to be re-
solved. Counsel appointed to represent a Rule 37.1 petitioner are obligated 
to continue their representation throughout the appeal from the circuit 
court’s order disposing of the issues raised and litigated in that court.232 Rule 
37.3 provides: 
(b) If the original petition, or a motion for appointment of counsel should 
allege that the petitioner is unable to pay the cost of the proceedings and 
to employ counsel, and if the court is satisfied that the allegation is true, 
the court may at its discretion appoint counsel for the petitioner for any 
hearing held in the circuit court. If a petition on which the petitioner was 
represented by counsel is denied, counsel shall continue to represent the 
petitioner for an appeal to the Supreme Court, unless relieved as counsel 
by the circuit court or the Supreme Court. If no hearing was held or the 
petitioner proceeded pro se at the hearing, the circuit court may at its dis-
cretion appoint counsel for an appeal upon proper motion by the peti-
tioner.
233
 
Thus, counsel proceeding by appointment of a circuit court in a Rule 37.1 
action may find themselves ethically obligated to not only represent the in-
digent petitioner in the trial court for purposes of conducting the evidentiary 
hearing, but through the entire appellate process, as well.234 
 
 231. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.3(b). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. (emphasis added). 
 234. In Morgan v. State, the defendant argued in his pro se filing, that he had been denied 
credit for jail time served prior to revocation of his probated sentence, filed when trial coun-
sel moved to withdraw from further representation under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 
(1967) and then-Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-3(j) (now, Rule 4-3(k)) based on counsel’s 
contention that the appeal from revocation of probation would be meritless. 73 Ark. App. 
107, 108, 42 S.W.3d 569, 570 (2001). The appellate court found that the denial of credit for 
defendant’s prior confinement on two occasions while the probation remained in effect could 
be corrected through a Rule 37 action. Id. at 110, 42 S.W.3d at 572. The court agreed with 
counsel that the direct appeal was “without merit,” but declined to relieve counsel, explain-
ing: “[B]ecause further relief regarding Mr. Morgan’s sentencing may be obtained from the 
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The duty imposed by the ethical rules regarding termination of repre-
sentation will require that counsel continue representation throughout the 
appellate process following the circuit court’s ruling on the grounds asserted 
in the petition, unless counsel is relieved of further obligation.235 Rule 16 of 
the appellate rules in criminal cases specifically requires counsel represent-
ing the defendant on appeal to continue representation through the appellate 
process “unless permitted by the trial court or the appellate court to with-
draw in the interest of justice or for other sufficient cause.”236 The applica-
tion of this approach to the filing of the petition for review in Rule 37.1 cas-
es is not clear. Subsections (b) and (c) directly refer to the situation involv-
ing withdrawal of counsel in Rule 37.5 postconviction petitions, but these 
are actions that are limited to capital prosecutions in which the death penalty 
has been imposed.237 Otherwise, there is no general rule governing counsel’s 
representation in Rule 37.1 litigation. Subsection (a), for instance, references 
counsel’s duty when a “notice of appeal of a judgment of conviction has 
 
trial court, we decline to relieve his counsel from representation.” Id. at 111, 42 S.W.3d at 
572. 
 235. ARK. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16. The rule generally provides that counsel may not 
withdraw from representation except under circumstances identified in subsection (b), one of 
which recognizes withdrawal when continuing representation will impose an “unreasonable 
financial burden” on counsel. ARK. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(b)(6). Even when counsel is 
permitted to withdraw from representation, subsections (c) and (d) require counsel to protect 
the client’s position in the representation: 
(c) A lawyer must comply with applicable law requiring notice to or permission 
of a tribunal when terminating a representation. When ordered to do so by a tri-
bunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for 
terminating the representation. 
(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent 
reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving reasonable 
notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering 
papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance 
payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred. The lawyer may 
retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law. 
ARK. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(c)–(d). 
The rule does not recognize counsel’s assessment of the client’s position as unlikely to be 
successful as a basis for withdrawal, although subsection (b)(7) authorizes termination of the 
relationship with the client if “other good cause for withdrawal exists.” ARK. R. PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 1.16(b)(7). This provision would apparently authorize withdrawal if counsel 
believes the claim urged by the client is frivolous or does not reflect “a good faith argument 
for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.” ARK. R. PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1. 
 236. ARK. R. APP. P.–CRIM. 16. The rule provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) Trial counsel, whether retained or court-appointed, shall continue to represent 
a convicted defendant throughout any appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court or 
Arkansas Court of Appeals, unless permitted by the trial court or the appellate 
court to withdraw in the interest of justice or for other sufficient cause. 
Id. 
 237. ARK. R. APP. P.–CRIM. 16(b)–(c). 
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been filed with the trial court,”238 which deals with the direct appeal from a 
conviction at trial, not a postconviction action. 
Moreover, counsel appointed to undertake or continue representation 
may be unfairly burdened because the circuit court appointing counsel under 
Rule 37.3(b) has no authority to order compensation for counsel’s services. 
In Arkansas Public Defender Commission v. Greene County Circuit 
Court,239 the supreme court held that the circuit court’s order that the Public 
Defender Commission reimburse trial counsel for representation in a Rule 
37.1 proceeding was invalid.240 Relying on case law holding that postconvic-
tion proceedings are civil in nature,241 rather than criminal matters, and that 
the Commission is not statutorily liable for compensation for representation 
in civil proceedings,242 the court rejected the trial court’s authority to order 
compensation for postconviction counsel.243 
In contrast, the circuit court appointing an indigent capital defendant in 
a Rule 37.5244 postconviction action in a case in which a death sentence has 
been imposed does have the authority to order compensation of appointed 
counsel in “such rates or amounts as the courts determine to be reasona-
ble.”245 The authority for payment of compensation for counsel’s representa-
tion does not rest on any inherent authority of the circuit courts that might 
be predicated on the fact that the death sentence had been imposed in the 
 
 238. ARK. R. APP. P.–CRIM. 16(a). 
 239. 343 Ark. 49, 32 S.W.3d 470 (2000). The court suggested that counsel providing 
representation in a non-capital Rule 37 proceeding might seek compensation through the 
Arkansas Claims Commission. Id. at 58, 32 S.W.3d at 476; accord Op. Ark. Att’y. Gen. No. 
229 (2005). The Arkansas Claims Commission, which operates as a fact-finding body for the 
Arkansas General Assembly, exists to consider monetary claims against the State that are 
jurisdictionally-barred by the constitutional sovereign immunity provision. About the Com-
mission, ARK. ST. CLAIMS COMMISSION, 
https://arclaimscommission.arkansas.gov/AboutUs.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2019); see also 
ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 20. Claims that cannot be heard in the state courts can be brought be-
fore the Claims Commission for decision, ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-10-204(b)(2)(A) (West 
2019), that is then subject to appeal to the General Assembly, ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-10-211 
(West 2019). 
 240. Ark. Pub. Def. Comm’n, 343 Ark. at 58, 32 S.W.3d at 476. 
 241. Id. at 55–56, 32 S.W.3d at 474–75. 
 242. Id. at 52, 54–55, 32 S.W.3d at 474 (citing Ark. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Burnett, 340 
Ark. 233, 238, 12 S.W.3d 191, 194 (2000)). The court also rejected trial counsel’s argument 
that the trial court’s appointment ultimately required him to provide uncompensated represen-
tation constituted a violation of his right to due process. Id. at 57–58, 32 S.W.3d at 476. But it 
did not actually address counsel’s due process claim on the merits; rather, the court simply 
ruled that because counsel had offered no convincing authority in support of his claim, it 
would not address its merits, consistent with the court’s traditional view. Id., 32 S.W.3d at 
476. 
 243. Id. at 57, 32 S.W.3d at 475–76. 
 244. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.5. 
 245. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 37.5(j). 
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petitioner’s case, but rather, on statutory authority expressly authorizing 
compensation of capital counsel.246 
The limitation upon the circuit court’s authority to order payment of 
compensation for counsel appointed to represent petitioners pursuing Rule 
37.1 relief reflects the difficult predicament for indigent criminal defendants 
typically forced to proceed pro se, without professional assistance, in chal-
lenging their convictions or sentences on the basis of ineffective representa-
tion on the part of trial counsel. This situation may readily compromise the 
Arkansas defendant seeking to challenge representation by trial or appellate 
counsel as a matter of the federal constitutional guarantee of effective assis-
tance of counsel promised by the Sixth Amendment.247 
However, the problem posed by lack of representation for indigent de-
fendants has been addressed by the Supreme Court of the United States in 
Martinez v. Ryan248 and Trevino v. Thaler.249 The Court recognized the diffi-
culty faced by indigent postconviction litigants challenging representation 
provided by counsel at trial and in the initial step in the direct appeal process 
as ineffective.250 Generally, defendants are advised that the ineffective assis-
tance challenge almost always should be raised in the postconviction pro-
cess.251 The limited exception to the rule arises when the issue has been 
raised and fully litigated by motion for new trial, permitting the develop-
ment of the necessary record for full review of counsel’s representation, 
including counsel’s disclosure of strategic considerations for decisions made 
in the conduct of the case.252 
In Martinez, the Court held procedural default of the ineffective assis-
tance claim could be excused by the federal habeas court when it resulted 
from the petitioner’s failure to assert counsel’s ineffectiveness in the first 
step in postconviction process where Arizona law mandated that the claim 
be raised at that point or lost.253 Subsequently, in Trevino, the Court extend-
 
 246. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-91-202(f) (West 2019) (as referenced in section (j) of Rule 
37.5 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure). 
 247. E.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). 
 248. 566 U.S. 1 (2012). 
 249. 569 U.S. 413 (2013). 
 250. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003) (ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claims should typically be litigated in postconviction proceedings). 
 251. See, e.g., Lasiter v. State, 290 Ark. 96, 97, 717 S.W.2d 198, 199 (1986) (“Ordinarily 
we do not consider a charge of ineffectiveness when a case is first appealed, for the facts 
relevant to that issue have not been developed.”). 
 252. See, e.g., Missildine v. State, 314 Ark. 500, 507, 863 S.W.2d 813, 818 (1993) (where 
claim of ineffective assistance raised in motion for new trial, record of evidentiary hearing 
permits review of claim on direct appeal). 
 253. 566 U.S. at 17 (“Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not 
bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, 
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ed the excuse for procedural default to those ineffective assistance claims 
litigated in state postconvictions without benefit of effective assistance of 
counsel in that process, regardless of whether the state required the claim to 
be raised in the postconviction process.254 With respect to a claim based on 
asserted failure of trial or direct appeal counsel to perform effectively, these 
cases support a requirement for effective assistance for the postconviction 
litigant whose Sixth Amendment claim would otherwise be defaulted be-
cause it could not, or should not, have been brought in the direct appeal. 
This development is significant for state court defendants petitioning for 
federal habeas relief who have been forced to proceed without benefit of 
counsel or face procedural default of their claims. 
V. EXHAUSTION OF STATE COURT REMEDIES AND REVIEW OF FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS 
The significance of the change in appellate jurisdiction is particularly 
apparent in the obligation for litigants raising claims regarding federal con-
stitutional violations to exhaust available state remedies prior to seeking 
relief from adverse decisions in federal actions. The state court defendant 
whose federal constitutional claims have been rejected by state courts has 
two options for seeking relief in the federal system for violations. The de-
fendant may petition the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of 
certiorari to review the state court disposition in the direct appeal process255 
or from a decision on a federal claim initially litigated in state postconvic-
tion process.256 The Barnes footnote clearly addressed appellate review of 
 
in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding 
was ineffective.”). 
 254. 569 U.S. at 423. 
 255. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2018). The petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of a 
state court decision rendered by the highest court of a State is characterized by the Court as 
the final step in the direct appeal process, with the ruling on the certiorari petition serving to 
finalize, or conclude, the direct appeal process. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n.6 
(1987) (“By ‘final,’ we mean a case in which a judgment of conviction has been rendered, the 
availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for a petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition 
for certiorari finally denied.”). 
 256. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328. Section 1257(a) authorizes review of a decision of the 
“highest court of a State in which a decision could be had,” which includes a decision ren-
dered in an action for postconviction litigated in the state court process. See, e.g., Hinton v. 
Alabama, 571 U.S. 263 (2014). The Court reviewed an ineffective assistance claim initially 
raised in state postconviction proceedings in which the evidence at the hearing showed that 
trial counsel had refused the trial court’s offer to provide additional funding for the defense to 
obtain the assistance of a qualified expert on ballistics. Id. at 270. Three highly qualified 
experts testified that the unqualified “expert” called at trial failed to properly contest the 
prosecution’s theory of defendant’s involvement in the capital murder, supporting the Court’s 
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Rule 37.1 challenges that include claimed violations of federal constitution-
ally-protected rights, expressly the Sixth Amendment right to effective as-
sistance of counsel. Rejection of a Rule 37.1 petitioner’s ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claims in the state postconviction process may be addressed 
in a petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States 
seeking review of the ruling of the Arkansas Supreme Court upholding de-
nial of relief by the trial court.257 
The state court defendant may also seek relief on a claimed violation of 
a federal constitutional right in the federal habeas corpus process, pursuant 
to the federal habeas corpus statute.258 This remedy is significantly restrict-
ed, but may essentially be used by a state court defendant to assert a viola-
tion of federal constitutional protections in state court proceedings preserved 
in the state appeal or postconviction process.259 While direct review in the 
Supreme Court of the United States is not limited by the same restrictions as 
federal habeas actions, review is discretionary and the chances that the 
Court will grant review in any particular case are extremely remote.260 The 
Court itself provides the relevant data on its website: “The Court receives 
approximately 7,000-8,000 petitions for a writ of certiorari each Term. The 
Court grants and hears oral argument in about 80 cases.” 261 
 
conclusion that trial counsel’s decision not to accept the offered funding resulted in effective 
assistance. Id. 
 257. E.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). In fact, ineffective 
assistance claims are the primary claims raised in Rule 37.1 proceedings. See Howard v. 
State, 367 Ark. 18, 51, 238 S.W.3d 24, 49 (2006) (Hannah, C.J., dissenting). 
 258. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2018). 
 259. A claim that has not been preserved for review on the merits in state court proceed-
ings, whether in the state direct appeal or state postconviction process, will likely be barred 
from review on the merits in the federal habeas process. See Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 
(2002) (application of state procedural default rule to bar review on the merits, if routinely 
and fairly applied, will serve as adequate and independent determination on claim barring 
federal habeas review on the merits); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752–53 (1991) 
(procedural default of federal constitutional claim bars review on the merits in federal habeas 
litigation). 
 260. There is no requirement that the state court defendant petition the Supreme Court of 
the United States to issue the writ of certiorari on a federal constitutional claim prior to peti-
tioning for federal habeas corpus relief, nor does the Court’s denial of a petition for writ of 
certiorari serve as a decision on the merits that would bar relief on a federal constitutional 
claim asserted in a habeas action. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 456 (1953); Smith v. Baldi, 
344 U.S. 561, 565 (1953). 
 261. Frequently Asked Questions: General Information, SUP. CT. U.S., 
www.supremecourt.gov/about/faq_general.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2019). 
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A. State Court Dispositions as a Prerequisite for Federal Review 
Federal review typically rests on a threshold disposition of the federal 
constitutional claim in state proceedings.262 Consequently, the redirection of 
Rule 37.1 appellate review to the Arkansas Court of Appeals not only alters 
the framework for available state court remedies for those federal constitu-
tional claims, it also imposes an additional obligation upon state court liti-
gants to file for review in the state supreme court when the intermediate 
court rejects the defendant’s arguments. The Rule 37.1 applicant must peti-
tion for review to fully exhaust state remedies, at least in theory. Section 
2254 expressly commands: 
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies 
available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if 
he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available pro-
cedure, the question presented.
263
 
Subsection (c) is unequivocal in its directive, meaning that the Arkansas 
Rule 37.1 petitioner will be required to petition the state supreme court for 
review of any decision rendered by the court of appeals rejecting the claim 
for relief for violation of a federally-protected procedural right. 
Failure to petition for review in the Arkansas Supreme Court would 
mean that the Rule 37 petitioner had simply failed to raise his federal consti-
tutional claim of ineffective assistance, much as if the petitioner had not 
sought review by Rule 37 at all in challenging counsel’s effectiveness.264 
Similarly, a federal petition including a claim of a Brady-disclosure viola-
tion would have to be exhausted by the litigant by moving for leave in the 
 
 262. The State might affirmatively waive the requirement that the federal constitutional 
claim first be litigated fully in state proceedings in a federal habeas corpus action as a matter 
of strategy in order to avoid delay in reaching the decision on the merits of the claim in the 
federal action. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3) (“A State shall not be deemed to have waived the 
exhaustion requirement or be estopped from reliance upon the requirement unless the State, 
through counsel, expressly waives the requirement.”). 
 263. Id. § 2254(c) (emphasis added). 
 264. With respect to ineffective assistance claims, the Court’s decisions in Trevino and 
Martinez allow the indigent litigant unable to afford representation in the postconviction 
process an excuse for procedural default in failing to pursue available remedies in state court 
for challenging counsel’s effectiveness in representation. Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 
(2013); Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012). The unanswered question would be whether an 
Arkansas petitioner failing to petition for review from the adverse decision by the court of 
appeals on appeal from denial of Rule 37.1 relief would be extended the benefit of Martinez 
and Trevino in excusing the failure to fully exhaust that remedy available under the Arkansas 
rules. 
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Arkansas Supreme Court to reinvest the trial court of conviction with juris-
diction to consider the litigant’s petition for writ of error coram nobis.265 
Moreover, the requirement for exhaustion of state court remedies re-
quires that the petitioner not combine exhausted and unexhausted claims of 
constitutional violations in the petition for federal habeas relief. In Rose v. 
Lundy,266 the Court issued a critical decision requiring federal habeas courts 
to dismiss petitions including claims not previously litigated in appropriate 
state process, whether on appeal or in state postconviction proceedings.267 
The Court’s reasoning rested on the value for federal courts to respect state 
court determinations of federal constitutional issues raised in state prosecu-
tions, recognizing that state courts are obligated to enforce federal constitu-
tional protections.268 The Court explained: 
Because “it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a 
federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an oppor-
tunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation,” federal 
courts apply the doctrine of comity, which “teaches that one court should 
defer action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of 
another sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already cognizant of 
the litigation, have had an opportunity to pass upon the matter.”269 
Thus, the exhaustion requirement, according to Rose, reflects the comity 
principle by reducing “friction between our federal and state systems of jus-
tice by allowing the State an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct 
alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights.”270 In order to avoid dismissal 
of the unexhausted claims or the mixed petition containing exhausted and 
unexhausted claims, the petitioner may move to have the federal case held in 
abeyance, permitting litigation of the claims in any state process which re-
 
 265. For discussion regarding the coram nobis process under Arkansas law, see supra 
Section III.D.4. However, a claim of newly-discovered scientific evidence establishing the 
defendant’s innocence, a proper subject for litigation pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated 
sections 16-112-201 to -203, is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus and, thus, the exhaus-
tion question is essentially irrelevant with respect to the merits of such claims. See Herrera v. 
Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963). On the other 
hand, the exhaustion of a remedy of this kind would appear to toll the time for filing the 
federal petition. See Polson v. Bowersox, 595 F.3d 873, 875 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding habeas 
corpus proceeding authorized by rule was a form of collateral review qualifying for tolling of 
federal habeas filing period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(c)). For discussion of the Arkansas statu-
tory provision for relief based on newly discovered evidence, see supra Section III.D.3. 
 266. 455 U.S. 509 (1982). 
 267. Id. at 522 (“[B]ecause a total exhaustion rule promotes comity and does not unrea-
sonably impair the prisoner’s right to relief, we hold that a district court must dismiss habeas 
petitions containing both unexhausted and exhausted claims.”). 
 268. Id. at 522 (citing Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886)). 
 269. Id. at 518 (quoting Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950)). 
 270. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981). 
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main available to the petitioner for consideration on the merits by state 
courts.271 Pursuant to the Court’s decision in Rhines v. Weber,272 the habeas 
court may stay the federal proceedings while the petitioner attempts to ex-
haust state court remedies.273 Otherwise, a subsequent federal petition, rais-
ing issues litigated in state proceedings after the initial petition containing 
only exhausted claims, would be barred under § 2254(b)(1), and would have 
to be dismissed as an unauthorized successive petition,274 unless expressly 
permitted by the court of appeals under extremely rare circumstances.275 The 
circumstances either relate to a United States Supreme Court decision an-
nouncing a new rule held to apply retroactively to cases that have been final-
ized,276 or to the development of new facts that would warrant a conclusion 
that no reasonable fact-finder would have found the defendant guilty of the 
underlying offense.277 
The operation of the statute effectively prevents an Arkansas postcon-
viction petitioner from raising claims of constitutional violations, including 
ineffective assistance of counsel, in successive federal habeas corpus peti-
tions. The petitioner cannot, for instance, claim a violation of a procedural 
protection and then later claim that counsel was ineffective if the federal 
habeas court finds that the claim was procedurally defaulted. Prior to pursu-
ing federal relief, however, an Arkansas defendant might assert a defaulted 
claim on direct appeal from the conviction, and once the appellate court 
declines to review it on the merits based on counsel’s failure to preserve 
error, the defendant may present an ineffective assistance claim in a Rule 
37.1 petition following affirmance of the conviction on appeal.278 
 
 271. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (2018) (“An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted 
the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has 
the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question present-
ed.”). 
 272. 544 U.S. 269 (2005). 
 273. Id. at 278. 
 274. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (2018) (“Before a second or successive application per-
mitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate 
court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.”). 
 275. Id. § 2244(b)(3)(A)–(E), (b)(4). 
 276. Id. § 2244(b)(2)(A). 
 277. Id. § 2244(b)(2)(B). 
 278. The Arkansas Supreme Court expressed its hostility to this process in its seminal 
opinion, Wicks v. State, rejecting reliance on plain or fundamental error theories for review of 
defaulted claims on the merits in the direct appeal process: 
In closing, we mention a position sometimes taken in appellate briefs in criminal 
cases, that a possible error should be argued by counsel even in the absence of an 
objection below, because the matter might be raised in a petition for postconvic-
tion relief. The short answer to that suggestion is that if the supposed error actu-
ally calls for postconviction relief, the defect is not cured by the presentation of 
an argument that is certain to be rejected by this court for want of an objection at 
the trial. Nevertheless, if counsel insist upon consuming their time and that of the 
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B. The Boerckel Rule: The Requirement for Full Exhaustion of State 
Remedies 
In O’Sullivan v. Boerckel,279 the Supreme Court of the United States 
held that complete or full exhaustion of state court remedies was required 
before state court defendants could assert claims arising from the protections 
afforded by the Constitution in federal proceedings.280 The holding specifi-
cally addressed the requirement in the federal habeas corpus statute,281 that 
“[a]n applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies availa-
ble in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the 
right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the 
question presented.”282 Because the option of petitioning a state supreme 
court for discretionary review of a decision rejecting a federal constitutional 
claim by an intermediate appellate court constitutes an “available proce-
dure,” the decision requires the federal habeas petitioner to have petitioned 
for review in the state discretionary review process in order to meet the ex-
haustion requirement of § 2254(c).283 
Prior to the Court’s decision in Boerckel, several federal courts had de-
clined to hold that the exhaustion requirement includes the filing of a peti-
tion for discretionary review in a state supreme court for purposes of federal 
habeas jurisdiction.284 The Court’s holding in Boerckel resolved the conflict 
 
court in making such an unsupported argument, the argument should be preceded 
by a clear statement that no appropriate objection was made below and that the 
point is being presented despite that omission. 
270 Ark. 781, 786, 606 S.W.2d 366, 370 (1980) (emphasis added). The court’s approach 
ignores the fact that its rejection of the unpreserved claim will serve to support the postcon-
viction claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to protect the record, 
arguably meeting Strickland’s first prong of the Sixth Amendment claim in showing defec-
tive performance in the representation. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
 279. 526 U.S. 838 (1999). 
 280. Id. at 842. 
 281. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 
 282. Id. § 2254(c). 
 283. Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 848–49. 
 284. See Boerckel v. O’Sullivan, 135 F.3d 1194, 1199–1200 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1998); Dolny 
v. Erickson, 32 F.3d 381, 384 (8th Cir. 1994) (discretionary review in Minnesota Supreme 
Court not necessary for exhaustion of claim); Buck v. Green, 743 F.2d 1567, 1569 (11th Cir. 
1984) (Georgia Supreme Court’s limited jurisdiction in discretionary appeals does not obli-
gate state inmate to present claim in discretionary petition in order to assert claim in federal 
habeas). The Seventh Circuit had noted that other circuits had held to the contrary with re-
spect to this exhaustion issue. Boerckel, 135 F.3d at 1199 n.2. (citing Jennison v. Goldsmith, 
940 F.2d 1308, 1310 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (exhaustion of claim for Arizona inmate 
requires presentation of claim in petition for discretionary review); Grey v. Hoke, 933 F.2d 
117, 119 (2d Cir. 1991) (exhaustion requires petition for discretionary review of claims sub-
sequently asserted in federal habeas petition); Richardson v. Procunier, 762 F.2d 429, 431–32 
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in requiring full exhaustion of available state remedies, including the peti-
tion for discretionary review in a state’s supreme court, when this level of 
review is provided for by state postconviction procedure. At the same time, 
it left undisturbed the possibility that such a level of discretionary review 
might not be available in some states. It did not ultimately resolve the ques-
tion of whether state courts could excuse exhaustion of state remedies on 
federal constitutional claims as matters of state court policy.285 
Boerckel argued that the Illinois Supreme Court’s language in Rule 
315(a) expressly discouraged the filing of petitions for discretionary review 
in the supreme court when the issues to be raised would be routine in na-
ture.286 Rule 315(a) provides, in pertinent part: 
Whether such a petition will be granted is a matter of sound judicial dis-
cretion. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the 
court’s discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be consid-
ered: the general importance of the question presented; the existence of a 
conflict between the decision sought to be reviewed and a decision of the 
Supreme Court, or of another division of the Appellate Court; the need 
for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s supervisory authority; and the fi-
nal or interlocutory character of the judgment sought to be reviewed.
287 
Since the court had discouraged the filing of discretionary review petitions 
to exhaust state remedies prior to filing for federal review in “routine” cases, 
Boerckel argued that he should not be required to file what the state court 
had suggested would amount to a futile filing. Based on Rule 315(a)’s limit-
ing language, the discretionary review process, in this sense, would be “un-
available” to a petitioner who could not show that his claim qualified for 
review under the terms of the Rule.288 
The Supreme Court of the United States, however, read the language of 
§ 2254(c) strictly, as requiring exhaustion of any process made available 
under state law, regardless of whether the exhaustion might be futile in 
terms of seeking to overturn state court precedent on a federal constitutional 
 
(5th Cir. 1985) (petition for discretionary review by Texas Court of Criminal Appeals requi-
site for exhaustion of federal habeas claims)). 
 285. Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 847–48. The Court observed: 
The exhaustion doctrine, in other words, turns on an inquiry into what procedures are “avail-
able” under state law. In sum, there is nothing in the exhaustion doctrine requiring federal 
courts to ignore a state law or rule providing that a given procedure is not available. 
Id. The unresolved issue lies in determining when a state, by rule or law, has declared that a 
petition for discretionary review is “not available.” 
 286. Id. at 846–47. 
 287. ILCS S. CT. R. 315 (addressing discretionary review, noting that review may be 
available as a “matter of right” in certain circumstances). 
 288. Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 846–47. 
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claim.289 When confronted by this concern based on increased state court 
filings, the Court seemingly dismissed the issue as insignificant: 
We acknowledge that the rule we announce today—requiring state pris-
oners to file petitions for discretionary review when that review is part of 
the ordinary appellate review procedure in the State—has the potential to 
increase the number of filings in state supreme courts. We also recognize 
that this increased burden may be unwelcome in some state courts be-
cause the courts do not wish to have the opportunity to review constitu-
tional claims before those claims are presented to a federal habeas 
court.
290
 
The Court’s willingness to force state litigants to exhaust seemingly futile 
state court remedies and the concomitant burden imposed on state courts of 
last resort, stems from the Court’s overriding concern with comity. It ex-
plained: “By requiring state prisoners to give the Illinois Supreme Court the 
opportunity to resolve constitutional errors in the first instance, the rule we 
announce today serves the comity interests that drive the exhaustion doc-
trine.”291 
The Court’s position in Boerckel has an important consequence for Ar-
kansas postconviction litigants proceeding without assistance of counsel. 
The requirement for complete exhaustion imposed by the Supreme Court of 
the United States means that the Arkansas petitioner proceeding without 
counsel in the required petition for review of a federal constitutional claim, 
most commonly based on ineffective assistance of counsel, must completely 
exhaust state remedies by filing the petition for review in the state supreme 
court in order to fully exhaust a claim rejected by the Arkansas Court of 
Appeals on appeal from denial of Rule 37.1 relief. Even when the Arkansas 
petitioner preserves an ineffective assistance claim in the Rule 37.1 petition 
filed in the trial court, complete exhaustion will require the defendant to not 
only preserve the claim on appeal to the court of appeals, but also, to then 
petition the state supreme court to review the claim once it has been rejected 
by the intermediate court. 
 
 289. Id. at 847–48. 
 290. Id. at 847. 
 291. Id. at 846. There is, of course, some inconsistency in directing state courts to consid-
er marginally colorable claims presented in petitions for discretionary review in order to 
respect the notion of comity, in light of the Court’s explanation that its rule rested on respect 
for state court process. 
Because “it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal district court 
to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a consti-
tutional violation,” federal courts apply the doctrine of comity, which “teaches that one court 
should defer action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another sov-
ereignty with concurrent powers, and already cognizant of the litigation, have had an oppor-
tunity to pass upon the matter.” Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950). 
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Ultimately, the Martinez/Trevino principle will, in theory, enable those 
Arkansas petitioners who have been forced to proceed pro se in the Rule 
37.1 appeal process, including filing the petition for review in the supreme 
court, to claim the excuse from procedural default in failing to file the peti-
tion for review afforded by the Court in Trevino. However, the Court’s re-
cent decision in Davila v. Davis292 limits application of the Martinez/Trevino 
rule to claims of ineffective assistance based on trial counsel’s defective 
performance and does not afford an excuse for procedural default based on 
appellate counsel’s failure to properly argue issues that would arguably re-
quire relief on appeal.293 To the extent that a pro se Rule 37.1 petitioner’s 
failure to petition for review by the Arkansas Supreme Court following re-
jection of the federal constitutional claim by the Arkansas Court of Appeals 
would result in a failure to exhaust state remedies, this omission would ap-
pear to be excused by application of the Martinez/Trevino rationale. 
C. Ineffective Assistance Claims and the Petition for Review 
The rule applied in Boerckel requires the Arkansas Rule 37.1 petitioner 
asserting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to petition the state su-
preme court for review of a decision rendered by the court of appeals reject-
ing the claim urged on appeal from the denial of relief ordered by the trial 
court of conviction. This two-step process for exhaustion of the usual appel-
late process in Arkansas appeals, predicated on the filing of the petition for 
review pursuant to Rule 2-4, would appear to apply to appeal in Rule 37.1 
actions.294 
1. The Arkansas Supreme Court’s Construction of Rule 1-2(b) 
The reassignment of appellate review in Rule 37.1 appeals from the 
Arkansas Supreme Court to the court of appeals, particularly with respect to 
appeals including ineffective assistance of counsel claims, raises a question 
of the propriety of filing the petition for review in the supreme court once 
the court of appeals has disposed of the ineffective assistance claims. The 
context in which the propriety of the petition for review arises, Rule 2-
4(c)295 requires a showing of one of three grounds: a tie vote in the court of 
appeals; a court of appeals decision in conflict with published precedent; or 
 
 292. 137 S. Ct. 2058 (2017). 
 293. See supra text accompanying note 106. 
 294. As of May 15, 2019, the author has found no decisions of the Arkansas Supreme 
Court indicating that it had either granted or denied review on a Rule 37.1 appeal that had 
been decided by the Arkansas Court of Appeals. 
 295. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 2-4. For text of Rule 2-4(c), see supra note 223. 
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a claim that the court of appeals erred in disposing of a ground set forth in 
Rule 1-2(b).296 
With respect to Rule 37.1 appeals presenting ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims, Rule 1-2(b), which provides for review of “issues involving 
federal constitutional interpretation,”297 would appear to include review of 
ineffectiveness claims that arise under the Sixth Amendment298 and involve 
application of Strickland v. Washington.299 However, in at least two un-
published decisions, the Arkansas Supreme Court has held that ineffective 
assistance claims are not within the purview of Rule 2-4. In Munn v. State,300 
the defendant filed a petition for review after the court of appeals rejected 
his argument that appellate counsel had rendered ineffective assistance on 
direct appeal.301 In declining to review his ineffective assistance point raised 
in his pro se Rule 2-4 petition, the supreme court explained: 
We find no ground pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 2-4(c) to grant the peti-
tion for review. The rule provides that review will not be granted without 
a showing by the petitioner that the decision of the court of appeals is in 
conflict with a prior holding of a published opinion of either this court or 
the court of appeals or that the court otherwise erred with respect to one 
of the grounds enumerated in Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(b). An assertion of in-
effective assistance of counsel, whether it pertains to trial or appellate 
counsel, is not a grounds [sic] included in our rule, and none of the other 
claims made by petitioner constitutes the requisite showing under the 
rule.
302
 
The per curiam order issued in Munn followed the supreme court’s reason-
ing in Murphy v. State.303 There, the court explained: 
Petitioner Murphy’s sole ground for seeking review of the court of ap-
peals decision is the allegation that he was not afforded adequate repre-
sentation by his attorney on appeal. A claim of inadequate representation 
is not one of the grounds set out in Rule 2-4(c). Such claims are within 
 
 296. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 2-4; see also ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(b). For text of Rule 1-2(b), see 
supra note 16. 
 297. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(b)(3). 
 298. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 299. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 300. No. CR 05-985, 2005 WL 2462251 (Ark. Oct. 6, 2005) (per curiam). 
 301. Id. at *1. The court of appeals also denied his pro se petition for rehearing. Munn v. 
State, CACR 02-1246, 2005 WL 2093093 (Ark. App. Aug. 31, 2005). 
 302. Munn, 2005 WL 2462251, at *1. 
 303. Murphy v. State, No. CR 99-1388, 1999 WL 1212876 (Ark. Dec. 16, 1999), aff’g 
No. CACR 99-375, 1999 WL 1051970 (Ark. App. Nov. 17, 1999). The Defendant filed a pro 
se petition for review pursuant to Rule 2-4. Id. at *1. 
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the purview of our postconviction rule, Criminal Procedure Rule 
37.1(d). The petition is therefore denied.
304
 
What is clear from these decisions is that both Munn and Murphy were at-
tempting to litigate their ineffective assistance claims in the direct appeal 
process, filing for review under Rule 2-4 after losing on their claims on ap-
peal in the court of appeals.305 The supreme court declined to review these 
claims on their merits, with the Murphy court expressly holding that ineffec-
tive assistance claims are deemed appropriate for litigation in Rule 37.1 pro-
ceedings.306 However, the court’s explanation of its rationale for declining 
review of these claims is not precisely correct because the limitation on re-
view actually flows from the list of generic claims included in Rule 1-
2(b),307 as the court explained in Munn.308 
The status of the decisions in Munn and Murphy as controlling prece-
dent is somewhat questionable. First, the per curiam orders issued by the 
state supreme court were not published when issued. Reliance on these opin-
ions as precedent is precluded by the current version of Rule 5-2(c).309 Nev-
ertheless, it is not clear what the current court would do with respect to these 
prior, online-accessible statements that question whether Rule 2-4 petitions 
would be subject to review in postconviction actions in which ineffective 
 
 304. Id. (emphasis added). But see cases cited supra notes 248–54 and accompanying 
text. Claims of ineffective assistance may be litigated in the direct appeal following convic-
tion when the record includes evidence of counsel’s explanation of the objectively-reasonable 
strategic decision explaining counsel’s decision-making when their performance is alleged to 
have been defective. The claim would have been reserved by motion for new trial resulting in 
an evidentiary hearing for development of the record necessary for review by the appellate 
court. See Missildine v. State, 314 Ark. 500, 507, 863 S.W.2d 813, 818 (1993). 
 305. It is not unlikely that the claims of ineffectiveness were raised for the first time in 
the petition for review after the court of appeals declined to address claims on their merits 
because trial counsel failed to preserve error, arguably demonstrating that the first prong of 
the Strickland claim, defective performance by counsel, had been demonstrated by the appel-
late court’s refusal to address the claim on the merits. 
 306. Murphy, 1999 WL 1212876, at *1; see also Munn, 2005 WL 2462251, at *1. 
 307. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(b). For the text of subsection (b), see supra note 223. 
 308. 2005 WL 2462251, at *1. 
 309. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 5-2(c). The Explanatory Note to this rule states that this version of 
Rule 5-2 was effective as of July 1, 2009. The previous version of Rule 5-2(a) provided that 
“[a]ll signed opinions of the Supreme Court shall be designated for publication.” In re Ark. 
Supreme Court & Court of Appeals Rule 5-2, 2009 Ark. 330, at 3, 2009 Ark. Lexis 357, at 
*4. The order in Munn was issued per curiam; the court did not issue a signed opinion, which 
would have required publication affording the disposition precedential value. 2005 WL 
2462251, at *1. In Luna-Holbird v. State, the court explained, “An [sic] unanimous opinion 
of this court may be rendered as a Per Curiam opinion and not designated for publication at 
the discretion of the court. Only those opinions of this court which are signed must be desig-
nated for publication.” 315 Ark. 735, 736, 871 S.W.2d 328, 329 (1994) (citing ARK. SUP. CT. 
R. 5-2(a)). 
2019] RULE 37.1 POST-CONVICTION APPEALS 379 
 
assistance of counsel is asserted as an issue, often the only issue perhaps, 
raised in the Rule 37.1 petition. 
A significant consequence of any continuing viability of the un-
published orders lies in whether the jurisdictional preclusion of ineffective 
assistance claims from the Arkansas Supreme Court’s authority pursuant to 
Rules 2-4 and 1-2(b) serves to finalize these claims in the Arkansas system 
of review. If so, then a state court petitioner filing for federal habeas corpus 
relief would have exhausted the state remedies available to him once the 
court of appeals rules on the merits of his ineffective assistance claim. Be-
cause preclusion of ineffective assistance issues from the ambit of the su-
preme court’s exercise of jurisdiction under Rules 2-4 and 1-2(b) would 
permit no further state court review of the claim raised in the Rule 37.1 ac-
tion, the state court defendant petitioning for federal habeas relief would 
have exhausted available remedies, affording the federal court jurisdiction to 
consider the Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance claim on the merits. 
There would be no failure to exhaust state remedies barring the federal court 
from addressing the ineffectiveness issue because the highest court in the 
state had not ruled on the claim. 
Apart from the fact that Munn and Murphy are of dubious precedential 
value due to the fact that they were issued as unpublished, per curiam or-
ders, a second problem posed by their continuing viability lies in the fact 
that the holding that ineffectiveness assistance claims are not cognizable in 
Rule 2-4 petitions is simply incorrect. The Arkansas Supreme Court might 
well overrule, or “retreat”310 from those dispositions rendered in unsigned 
opinions, despite the fact that the two cases reflect the same approach over a 
period of time, clearly representing the court’s position at that point. In do-
ing so, the court might explain that redirection in the appeal from the denial 
of Rule 37.1 relief requires the court to reconsider its prior understanding of 
jurisdiction for purposes of Rule 2-4 petitions. Otherwise, the court might 
foreclose review of appellate court decisions ordering relief on appeal from 
the trial court, precluding the State from contesting cases in which the inef-
fective assistance claim is found to warrant relief.311 
 
 310. See, e.g., McCoy v. State, 347 Ark. 913, 921, 69 S.W.3d 430, 435 (2002) (emphasis 
added) (for court’s use of the term “retreat,” in lieu of “overrule”: “The holding in Thompson 
v. State, 284 Ark. 403, 682 S.W.2d 742 (1985) and its successors is in direct conflict with the 
plain language of section 5-1-110. Accordingly, we retreat from those holdings to the extent 
that they conflict with the statutory law.”). 
 311. Moreover, the range of potential relief accorded to the circuit court is broad and, 
presumably, the court of appeals could either affirm an order granting relief, or order relief 
from the same range of options in reversing the circuit court on appeal: “If the circuit court 
finds that for any reason the petitioner is entitled to relief, then the circuit court may set aside 
the original judgment, discharge the petitioner, resentence him or her, grant a new trial, or 
otherwise correct the sentence, as may appear appropriate in the proceedings.” ARK. R. CRIM. 
P. 37.4. 
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But, as a substantive matter, Munn and Murphy simply got it wrong. 
Claims of ineffective assistance are clearly recognized as arising from feder-
al constitutional protections included in the Sixth Amendment.312 The appli-
cation of the federal test for Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims controls disposition of those claims for defendants in Arkan-
sas state courts.313 Rule 1-2(b), which identifies those issues addressed on 
direct appeal by the Arkansas Court of Appeals that may be considered in 
the Rule 2-4 petition to the Arkansas Supreme Court for review of the appel-
late court’s disposition, expressly includes “issues involving federal consti-
tutional interpretation.”314 This ground for review can hardly be distin-
guished from review that requires interpretation of Strickland and applica-
tion of the Strickland standard for relief in assessing the ineffective assis-
tance claim on the merits. 
The federal habeas court’s authority to grant relief requires a showing 
either that the state court erred in its interpretation or in its application of 
United States Supreme Court precedent315 in addressing the state court de-
fendant’s ineffective assistance claim.316 Justice O’Connor explained the 
 
 312. See, e.g., Conley v. State, 2014 Ark. 172, at 4–5, 433 S.W.3d 234, 239 (2014); see 
also Henington v. State, 2012 Ark. 181, at 3–4, 403 S.W.3d 55, 58 (application of the federal 
protection as the controlling definition of the right to effective assistance of counsel for Ar-
kansas litigants); Howard v. State, 367 Ark. 18, 51, 238 S.W.3d 24, 49 (2006) (Hannah, C.J., 
dissenting) (“Rule 37 petitions most often concern issues of alleged ineffective assistance of 
counsel . . . .”). 
 313. See, e.g., Conley, 2014 Ark. 172, at 4–5, 433 S.W.3d at 39; see also discussion of 
Strickland supra notes 160. 
 314. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(b)(3). 
 315. The amended federal habeas statute, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, reflects the retroactivity ap-
proach adopted by the Court in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). See, e.g., (Terry) Wil-
liams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 380–81 (2000) (“AEDPA has added, immediately following 
the ‘clearly established law’ requirement, a clause limiting the area of relevant law to that 
‘determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) 
(1994 ed., Supp. III))); see also Teague, 489 U.S. at 296 (holding that only the Supreme 
Court can adopt new rules of constitutional criminal procedure and determine whether they 
will be applicable retroactively to cases in which the direct appeal process has been conclud-
ed and the conviction is final and reliance on newly announced rules is barred by the retroac-
tivity doctrine). 
 316. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2018). The federal habeas corpus petitioner is entitled to 
relief on a federal constitutional claim only by making one of two alternative showings. First, 
the petitioner can prevail by showing that the state court judgment “resulted in a decision that 
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States . . . .”. Id. (emphasis added). 
Alternatively, subsection (2) affords the habeas court authority to grant relief if the state 
court’s determination “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determina-
tion of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Id. § 
2254(d)(2) (emphasis added). 
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effect of this provision in her concurring opinion in Williams v. Taylor,317 
writing: 
Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ 
if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this 
Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently 
than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under 
the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant 
the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle 
from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the 
facts of the prisoner’s case.318 
The developing law of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment illustrates the necessity for continuing state court involvement 
in the interpretation of this class or category of federal constitutional claims 
when addressed by state courts. The Court’s approach leaves factually novel 
situations subject to review within the very general Strickland framework, 
not limited to the Court’s previous applications of the holding to specific 
fact complexes underlying the claims of defective performance and demand-
ing the assessment of probable prejudice be based on the evidentiary record 
presented in individual cases. 
For example, in recent years the Court has applied the Strickland defec-
tive performance prong to counsel’s duty to properly advise the client of 
potential deportation consequences following entry of a guilty plea,319 to 
counsel’s mistaken explanation of applicable law leading the client to reject 
a favorable plea offer,320 to counsel’s failure to convey a plea offer to the 
client,321 and to counsel’s failure to accept the trial court’s offer of funds for 
employment of a qualified expert witness.322 With regard to each variation 
on the defective performance issue raised in state proceedings, the Supreme 
Court of the United States ultimately applied Strickland to warrant relief 
from counsel’s error in representing the petitioner convicted in state court.323 
 
The holding in (Michael) Williams v. Taylor limits relief on this theory of state court error to 
those facts actually developed in the state court proceedings. 529 U.S. 420, 440 (2000). This 
ground precludes development of additional factual evidence in an evidentiary hearing in the 
habeas court unless the petitioner can demonstrate cause on the part of the State to prevent 
development of the factual record necessary to support his claim in the federal habeas pro-
cess, under the test set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). 
 317. (Terry) Williams, 529 U.S. at 412–13. 
 318. Id. at 412–13 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 319. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 368–69 (2010). 
 320. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 167, 169 (2012). 
 321. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 145 (2012). 
 322. Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263, 274 (2014); see supra note 259. 
 323. Hinton, 571 U.S. at 274; Frye, 566 U.S. at 145; Lafler, 566 U.S. at 169; Padilla, 559 
U.S. at 368–69. 
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These decisions demonstrate that continued interpretation of the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee of effective assistance is warranted, even though 
there may be little additional development of Strickland-based deficiency 
issues.324 The court’s position in Munn and Murphy can hardly be consistent 
with the broad authority for review under section 1-2(b)(3) since state courts 
are obliged to at least consider arguments regarding interpretation of federal 
constitutional protections, when those issues are raised in state proceed-
ings.325 
It would seem appropriate for the Arkansas Supreme Court to retreat 
from its position in Munn and Murphy both because the redirection of the 
Rule 37.1 appeal process would preserve the State’s right to seek review of 
court of appeals’ decisions adverse to its position and reserve the role of 
review of federal constitutional claims in Arkansas actions to the supreme 
court. It is not altogether clear that the state supreme court is firmly commit-
ted to exercising its authority to interpret federal constitutional claims gen-
erally in the Rule 2-4 process. 
2. The Application of Rule 1-2(h) in Rule 37.1 Appeals 
Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1-2(h) provides: 
In all appeals from criminal convictions or postconviction relief matters 
heard in the Court of Appeals, the appellant shall not be required to peti-
tion for rehearing in the Court of Appeals or review in the Supreme 
Court following an adverse decision of the Court of Appeals in order to 
be deemed to have exhausted all available state remedies respecting a 
claim of error. When the claim has been presented to the Court of Ap-
peals or the Supreme Court, and relief has been denied, the appellant 
shall be deemed to have exhausted all available state remedies.
326
 
The rule addresses the process of exhaustion in a direct way, in which 
the Arkansas Supreme Court disavows any requirement that it provide for 
review of constitutional claims that have been rejected by the court of ap-
peals in the direct appeal or postconviction process. Initially, it is difficult to 
reconcile its promulgation and adoption by the court in 2001, following the 
 
 324. See, e.g., Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 952–55 (2010) (finding state court failed to 
properly review ineffective assistance claim in terms of probable prejudice to accused in 
remanding to state court for reconsideration). 
 325. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 n.8 (1983) (“The state courts are required 
to apply federal constitutional standards, and they necessarily create a considerable body of 
‘federal law’ in the process.”) (emphasis added); see Barnes v. State, 2017 Ark. 76, at 1 n.1, 
511 S.W.3d 845, 846 n.1. 
 326. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(h) (emphasis added). Subsection (h) was adopted by the state 
supreme court in its order In re Ark. Rules of Criminal Procedure 24.3 and 33.3; Supreme 
Court Rule 1-2, 343 Ark. 872, 875 (Feb. 15, 2001) (per curiam). 
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United States Supreme Court’s issuance of its decision in O’Sullivan v. 
Boerckel,327 two years earlier in 1999. However, the Boerckel Court also 
recognized by implication that some state appellate systems might apparent-
ly do more than simply discourage litigants from pursuing discretionary 
relief in state supreme courts for review of adverse rulings on federal consti-
tutional claims rendered by intermediate appellate courts.328 
Rule 1-2(h) parallels the position taken by the South Carolina Supreme 
Court in 1990,329 where that court explained its position on exhaustion: 
We recognize that criminal and post-conviction relief litigants have rou-
tinely petitioned this Court for writ of certiorari upon the Court of Ap-
peals’ denial of relief in order to exhaust all available state remedies. We 
therefore declare that in all appeals from criminal convictions or post-
conviction relief matters, a litigant shall not be required to petition for 
rehearing and certiorari following an adverse decision of the Court of 
Appeals in order to be deemed to have exhausted all available state rem-
edies respecting a claim of error. Rather, when the claim has been pre-
sented to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, and relief has been 
denied, the litigant shall be deemed to have exhausted all available state 
remedies. This order shall become effective immediately.
330
 
The South Carolina court adopted this rule well before the Supreme Court of 
the United States issued its decision in Boerckel nine years later and six 
years before the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen-
alty Act,331 which includes strict statutory requirements for exhaustion of 
state remedies.332 
The Boerckel majority noted the South Carolina rule and, additionally, 
an Arizona decision, State v. Sandon,333 in addressing the argument Boerckel 
advanced that its holding would result in increased filing of unwanted peti-
 
 327. 526 U.S. 838, 846 (1999). 
 328. Supra, note 288, and accompanying text. The majority noted: “In this regard, we 
note that nothing in our decision today requires the exhaustion of any specific state remedy 
when a State has provided that that remedy is unavailable.” 526 U.S. at 847. 
 329. In re Exhaustion of State Remedies in Criminal & Post-Conviction Relief Cases, 
321 S.C. 563, 471 S.E.2d 454 (1990); see State v. Lyles, 381 S.C. 442, 443–44, 673 S.E.2d 
811, 812–13 (2009) (affirming and applying exhaustion policy). 
 330. In re Exhaustion of State Remedies, 321 S.C. at 564, 471 S.E.2d at 454. 
 331. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214. 
 332. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)–(c) (2018). In subsection (c), the federal habeas statute express-
ly requires exhaustion of any state remedy available to assert a federal constitutional claim 
“(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts 
of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State 
to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.” Id. § 2254(c). 
 333. 777 P.2d 220 (Ariz. 1989). 
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tions for discretionary review in the Illinois Supreme Court,334 arguably frus-
trating its usual rationale that federal review should respect state court deci-
sion-making as a matter of comity.335 While the South Carolina court’s posi-
tion on exhaustion reflected an affirmative statement regarding the exhaus-
tion process generally, the Arizona approach was the product of evolution. 
Initially, the Arizona court had directed counsel not to file petitions for re-
view in cases in which counsel had filed Anders briefs, concluding that the 
appeal was without merit, or frivolous.336 But Sandon expanded upon its 
rationale regarding the futility of petitioning for review in cases in which the 
court of appeals had held, based on an Anders assessment that the appeal 
was without merit. Sandon relied on State v. Shattuck,337 where the state 
supreme court had considered, but rejected, availability of review following 
disposition by the court of appeals based on its finding that the appeal was 
without merit, or frivolous. The Shattuck court explained: 
Since we are not required to accept petitions for review in Anders type 
cases, we do not invite them. The system is strained to the point that we 
cannot afford the luxury of repeated review of trivia or issues of small 
merit. The time available to prosecutors, defenders, judicial staff and 
judges must be devoted to issues of substance.
338
 
It concluded: “Neither retained nor appointed counsel should seek review by 
this court when the only issues that can be raised are without merit or frivo-
lous.”339 
In Sandon, the court expanded upon the Shattuck holding and held that 
when the appellate had obtained a ruling on all issues presented on direct 
appeal, further review was not required for exhaustion of state court reme-
dies. It concluded that the same rule applied to cases not based on Anders 
filings. Only limited circumstances warranted review of cases decided by 
the court of appeals, such as newly discovered evidence of innocence or 
undermining the finding of guilt or a change in law implicating the petition-
er’s conviction of such significance that the rule should be applied retroac-
tively.340 Thus, in Shattuck, the Arizona court had addressed the same issues 
 
 334. 526 U.S. at 847. 
 335. Comity may be defined as “[t]he legal principle that political entities (such as states, 
nations, or courts from different jurisdictions) will mutually recognize each other’s legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial acts. The underlying notion is that different jurisdictions will 
reciprocate each other’s judgments out of deference, mutuality, and respect.” Comity Defini-
tion, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/comity (last visited Mar. 30, 2018). 
 336. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 295 (2000). 
 337. 684 P.2d 154 (Ariz. 1984). 
 338. Id. at 157. 
 339. Id. at 158. 
 340. State v. Sandon, 777 P.2d 220, 221 (Ariz. 1989). 
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of strained judicial resources prompting the Illinois court’s position in Rule 
315(a).341 
In adopting Rule 1-2(h), the Arkansas Supreme Court was unequivocal 
in its position in light of Boerckel. The Reporter’s Notes to Rule 1-2(h)342 
specifically address the state supreme court’s view. The Notes cite the 
Court’s language from its decision relating to the “availability” of review 
under state law in determining whether there were additional steps in the 
exhaustion process that must be completed before a state petitioner could 
seek federal review.343 The Notes conclude: “Petitions for review, which are 
discretionary under subdivision (e) of this rule, should not be required in 
order for a state prisoner to exhaust his state remedies.”344 
The controlling issue in determining when state processes are essential 
for exhaustion would appear to be whether the petitioner has a right to fur-
ther review in state appellate process, or whether review is available only if 
afforded by the state supreme court. The South Carolina rule and Arizona 
decisions rest on the notion that if the petitioner only has the right to petition 
for review rather than the right to review, the remedy is not “available” to 
the petitioner. Rule 1-2(h) fits within this same analysis and is applicable to 
Arkansas postconviction process with the Arkansas Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Barnes, redirecting appellate jurisdiction in Rule 37.1 actions to the 
Arkansas Court of Appeals instead of Rule 37.1 appeals traditionally being 
filed and heard by the state supreme court. Thus, under the process ordered 
in the Barnes footnote, the language in Rule 1-2(h) relating to postconvic-
tion proceedings raises the same question concerning the availability of the 
 
 341. 684 P.2d at 157. 
 342. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-2(h) note (holdings of the Supreme Court of the United States 
were the reason for adding Subdivision h). The full text of the note provides: 
Subdivision (h) was added in response to language in O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 
526 U.S. 838 [] (1999)(“[N]othing in our decision today requires the exhaustion 
of any specific state remedy when a State has provided that that remedy is una-
vailable. Section 2254(c), in fact, directs federal courts to consider whether a ha-
beas petitioner has ‘the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available 
procedure, the question presented,’. . . . The exhaustion doctrine, in other words, 
turns on an inquiry into what procedures are ‘available’ under state law. In sum, 
there is nothing in the exhaustion doctrine requiring federal courts to ignore a 
state law or rule providing that a given procedure is not available.”) Id., 526 U.S. 
at 848. Petitions for review, which are discretionary under subdivision (e) of this 
rule, should not be required in order for a state prisoner to exhaust his state rem-
edies. 
Id. 
 343. Id. (“The exhaustion doctrine, in other words, turns on an inquiry into what proce-
dures are ‘available’ under state law. In sum, there is nothing in the exhaustion doctrine re-
quiring federal courts to ignore a state law or rule providing that a given procedure is not 
available.” (quoting Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 838)). 
 344. Id. 
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petition for review by the state supreme court in Arkansas cases as that for-
merly addressed by the South Carolina Supreme Court. The South Carolina 
court was clear: 
We therefore declare that in all appeals from criminal convictions or 
post-conviction relief matters, a litigant shall not be required to petition 
for rehearing and certiorari following an adverse decision of the Court of 
Appeals in order to be deemed to have exhausted all available state rem-
edies respecting a claim of error. Rather, when the claim has been pre-
sented to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, and relief has been 
denied, the litigant shall be deemed to have exhausted all available state 
remedies.
345
 
Now, with the change in appellate jurisdiction over Rule 37.1 appeals, the 
application of Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1-2(h) has become particularly 
relevant, some eighteen years after its adoption by the supreme court.346 
Reliance on Boerckel’s oblique reference to the South Carolina’s rule 
to excuse the final step in Arkansas appellate process, the petition for review 
pursuant to Rule 2-4, remains troublesome. The Supreme Court has not 
clearly indicated that states may opt out of discretionary review by rule or 
case law and neither the majority’s brief reference, nor Justice Souter’s ex-
plicit discussion, arguably stand for more than dicta. There are apparently no 
decisions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit or 
South Carolina federal district court formally excusing a federal habeas peti-
tioner from the Boerckel requirement that discretionary review be denied 
before the federal habeas action is ripe. 
In State v. McKennedy,347 the South Carolina court confirmed its reli-
ance on the court’s 1990 statement rejecting the petition for discretionary 
review as a necessary step for exhaustion of state remedies.348 The McKen-
nedy court relied on the explicit reference in Boerckel to the “ordinary ap-
pellate procedure . . . in the State”349 in response to the question: “What 
remedies must a habeas petitioner invoke to satisfy the federal exhaustion 
requirement?”350 It then explained that it had defined the discretionary re-
view petition as “outside South Carolina’s standard review process.”351 In so 
explaining, the court relied on the Ninth Circuit’s treatment of the Arizona 
approach to exhaustion of state remedies: 
 
 345. In re Exhaustion of State Remedies in Criminal & Post-Conviction Relief Cases, 
321 S.C. 563, 564, 471 S.E.2d 454, 454 (1990). 
 346. See supra note 326 referring to adoption of Rule 1-2(h) by order of the Arkansas 
Supreme Court in 1990. 
 347. 559 S.E.2d 850. 
 348. Id. at 854. 
 349. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 847 (1999). 
 350. Id. at 842. 
 351. McKennedy, 559 S.E.2d at 854. 
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Based on the Arizona statute and several Arizona opinions supporting 
the statute, the Ninth Circuit held post-conviction review by the Arizona 
Supreme Court to be a remedy that is “unavailable” within the meaning 
of [Boerckel]. Honoring the Arizona statute, the Ninth Circuit held that 
“claims of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal 
habeas once the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them.”352 
In Swoopes v. Sublett,353 the Ninth Circuit considered the Arizona posi-
tion on remand from the Supreme Court of the United States for reconsider-
ation of its initial decision in light of Boerckel.354 The circuit court had ini-
tially held in an unpublished memorandum that Swoopes had failed to fully 
exhaust all but one of his claims in the state courts before bringing the ex-
hausted and unexhausted claims in his federal habeas action.355 The Ninth 
Circuit had earlier ruled that a petitioner who had relief on Arizona prece-
dent in not petitioning the state supreme court to review the adverse decision 
by the state court of appeals rejecting his federal constitutional claims was 
entitled to relief from the exhaustion requirement in the federal habeas stat-
ute because he had been misled by the state court interpretation of the role of 
discretionary review for purposes of exhaustion of remedied.356 But 
Swoopes had petitioned for review of one of his claims, relating to allegedly 
tainted identifications by eye-witnesses and, as a consequence, the Circuit 
Court initially concluded that he could not plead that he had been misled by 
the state court’s exhaustion policy because he had, in fact, availed himself of 
the discretionary review process with respect to the claimed tainted eye-
witness testimony.357 
On remand from the Supreme Court of the United States on Swoopes’s 
petition for certiorari, the Ninth Circuit retreated from its position that he 
had failed to properly exhaust because he could not rely on the argument 
that he had been misled into not petitioning the state supreme court for re-
view of the intermediate appellate court’s adverse rulings on his constitu-
 
 352. Id. (quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
 353. 196 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 354. Swoopes v. Sublett, 527 U.S. 1001 (1999). 
 355. Swoopes v. Sublett, No. 94-16033, 1998 WL 657711, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 3, 1998). 
 356. Harmon v. Ryan, 959 F.2d 1457, 1462–63 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that the peti-
tioner had been misled by the Arizona Supreme Court’s approach to the exhaustion require-
ment imposed by the federal habeas statute). The Ninth Circuit noted that in Jennison v. 
Goldsmith, 940 F.2d 1308, 1311–12 (9th Cir. 1991), it had held that the Arizona exhaustion 
doctrine was not consistent with the requirements for exhaustion under the federal habeas 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (2018). Harmon, 959 F.2d at 1462–63. However, because Har-
mon had been misled by the Arizona precedent, the circuit court concluded that the rule for 
procedural default for unexhausted claims, it excused his failure to exhaust by failing to peti-
tion for review. Id. 
 357. Swoopes, 1998 WL 657711, at *3. 
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tional claims.358 Instead, it relied on Justice Souter’s concurring opinion in 
Boerckel, in which he observed that the discretionary petition to a state su-
preme court could be seen as being “outside the standard review process”359 
and not required for exhaustion of state remedies necessary for review of 
constitutional claims on the merits in federal habeas proceedings.360 The 
State then unsuccessfully petitioned for certiorari to review the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s decision on remand from the Supreme Court of the United States.361 
Subsequently, the Arizona federal district court summarized the state of 
Arizona exhaustion policy for purposes of federal habeas review in Crowell 
v. Knowles,362 explaining: 
Reviewing Arizona law, the court finds that the State has plainly re-
moved discretionary supreme court review from the standard review 
process for individuals sentenced to life in prison, and that Petitioner 
therefore exhausted even though he did not timely utilize that procedure. 
Contrary language in prior cases is both dictum and erroneous in its de-
scription of relevant Arizona statutes.
363
 
What appears clear is that the exhaustion policies adopted by the South 
Carolina and Arizona Supreme Courts have both served to satisfy federal 
habeas courts that the petition for review by the state supreme court is not 
required for exhaustion of federal constitutional claims that have been ad-
dressed and rejected by lower courts in those states. Instead, apparently rely-
ing on Justice Souter’s observation in Boerckel, those state supreme courts 
have avoided the unnecessary filings for review that the majority did not 
consider a sufficient basis to excuse discretionary review in the Illinois ex-
haustion process. Their policies on exhaustion, in contrast to the Illinois 
Supreme Court’s strong suggestion to litigants that discretionary review will 
almost always be futile, appear to have circumvented the majority’s usual 
preference for the petitioner to exhaust any available remedy in order to 
preserve a claim for federal review. 
When the petitioner does not exhaust the federal constitutional claim to 
be urged in the federal habeas petition by seeking discretionary review in a 
state supreme court, the ninety-day period for petitioning for certiorari in the 
 
 358. Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010–11. 
 359. 526 U.S. 838, 850 (1999) (Souter, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 360. Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010–11 (“In Moreno v. Gonzalez, 192 Ariz. 131, 962 P.2d 
205 (Ariz. 1998) the Arizona Supreme Court considered certified questions from us, and 
reiterated that a petition for review from the Arizona Court of Appeals is not part of a de-
fendant’s right to appeal.”). 
 361. Swoopes, 196 F.3d 1008, cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1124 (2000). Of course, the Court’s 
decision to deny certiorari has no precedential value. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 296 
(1989). 
 362. 483 F.Supp.2d 925, 927 (D. Ariz. 2007). 
 363. Id. at 927. 
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Supreme Court of the United States does not toll the one-year limitations 
period for filing the federal petition. Instead, the one-year period for filing 
the federal habeas petition, is tolled only by the time for filing for state dis-
cretionary review, as the Court clarified in Gonzales v. Thaler.364 For those 
state court litigants who do not petition for review in the direct appeal pro-
cess, the ninety-day filing period to petition the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States for certiorari does not toll the one-year period in which to file the 
federal habeas corpus petition, as the Court explained.365 Importantly, the 
ninety-day tolling period does not apply to petitioning for certiorari follow-
ing denial of relief in state postconviction matters, as a matter of statutory 
language.366 
Arkansas petitioners who have failed to timely file for federal relief 
within the one-year period of limitations for filing the habeas petition367 
have argued that they were entitled to rely on the additional ninety days for 
filing when the petitioner files for review by certiorari in the Supreme Court 
of the United States.368 But neither the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals nor 
 
 364. 565 U.S. 134 (2012). The Court abrogated the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Riddle v. 
Kemna, 523 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc) where the circuit court had held that the one-
year habeas corpus filing period was tolled until the mandate of the state court issued. Gonza-
les, 565 U.S. at 139. 
 365. Gonzales, 565 U.S. at 150. 
 366. Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 333–34 (2007). 
 367. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (2018) provides, in pertinent part: 
(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of ha-
beas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The 
limitation period shall run from the latest of— 
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct re-
view or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State ac-
tion in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if 
the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; 
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by 
the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court 
and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could 
have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction 
or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pend-
ing shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 
 368. Under § 2244(d)(1)(A), the time for filing the federal habeas petition is tolled while 
a timely-filed certiorari petition is pending in the Supreme Court of the United States, which 
the Court held, in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 320 n.8 (1987). Thus, the minimal 
ninety-day period for petitioning for certiorari tolls the one-year filing period while the certi-
orari remands pending. Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527 (2003) (citing Smith v. 
Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 348 (8th Cir. 1998); Williams v. Bruton, 299 F.3d 981, 982 (8th 
Cir. 2002). Then, in Gonzales v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 154 (2013) the Court held that the petition-
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Arkansas federal district courts have ruled that petitioners could rely on 
Rule 1-2(h) to claim the additional ninety-day period for petitioning for cer-
tiorari following rejection of their federal constitutional claims by the Ar-
kansas Court of Appeals to extend the one-year limitations for filing the 
federal habeas petition without having exhausted the remedy of filing for 
review under Rule 2-4.369 In Parmley v. Norris,370 the Eighth Circuit explic-
itly rejected reliance on Rule 1-2(h) as a basis for claiming that the one-year 
period for petitioning for federal habeas corpus was tolled for the ninety 
days permitted to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for certio-
rari.371 Parmley argued unsuccessfully that he could have properly petitioned 
for certiorari following rejection of his federal constitutional claim by the 
court of appeals without first petitioning for review in the Arkansas Su-
preme Court to exhaust review of the claim in the state appeal process.372 
Since Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1-2(h) is not specifically men-
tioned in Boerckel, it is not clear that application of the rule would be recog-
nized along with the exception for the South Carolina and Arizona ap-
proaches noted by the Court in its opinion. In light of the fact that the court 
did not include Rule 1-2(h) in its decision, the Eighth Circuit’s decision in 
Parmley will foreclose reliance on the Rule by Arkansas petitioners to ex-
pand the one-year period for filing for federal habeas relief by the ninety 
days that toll the filing to permit state court defendants to petition the Su-
preme Court of the United States by certiorari to review the rejection of fed-
eral constitutional claims by the court of appeals. 
Without United States Supreme Court recognition that Rule 1-2(h) af-
fords Arkansas Rule 37.1 litigants an alternative to the exhaustion of state 
remedies through Rule 2-4, required by Boerckel, a postconviction petitioner 
appealing denial of relief by the trial court must exhaust the petition for re-
view process. Otherwise, they face dismissal of their claims on the merits 
based on procedural default in failing to file for review pursuant to Rule 2-4. 
 
er who did not seek discretionary review in the state system could not claim that the federal 
habeas petition was timely based on the issuance of the state court’s mandate. 
 369. See Collier v. Norris, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1029–30 (E.D. Ark. 2005) (holding that 
because petitioner’s claim was not cognizable for petition for review under Rule 2-4 based on 
acceptable categories of claims under Rule 1-2(b), making the Arkansas Court of Appeals the 
“highest court” upon which a decision could be had on the claim, but denying relief on the 
merits), aff’d, 485 F.3d 415, 421, 426–27 (8th Cir. 2007); Ben-Yah v. Norris, 570 F.Supp.2d 
1086, 1094 (E.D. Ark. 2008) (rejecting Collier’s conclusion that Arkansas Court of Appeals 
was the “highest court” of the State as incorrectly reasoned). 
 370. 586 F.3d 1066 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 371. Id. at 1070–71 (holding state court of appeals not “highest court” for purposes of 
petitioning the Supreme Court of the United States for review by certiorari when claim not 
presented in Rule 2-4 petition). 
 372. Id. at 1071–72. 
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Arkansas petitioners who have not proceeded through Rule 2-4 seeking 
review of claims they intend to assert in the federal habeas process will like-
ly be required to respond to argument that these claims have not been 
properly preserved in the state court exhaustion process. Although the habe-
as court might hold the petition in abeyance to permit the petitioner to return 
to state court to explore exhaustion options,373 the time limits for filing the 
Rule 2-4 review petition will have undoubtedly expired at that point. In this 
scenario, the untimely filing in the Arkansas Supreme Court might result in 
dismissal of the petition without a definitive statement that Rule 1-2(h) does 
not require further exhaustion attempts under state law. A dismissal rein-
forcing Rule 1-2(h) as a controlling statement of Arkansas law might serve 
to avoid application of the procedural default in the federal habeas process 
but would also result in delay that could have been avoided by timely peti-
tioning for review under Rule 2-4. 
At the worst, however, a procedural morass could result, including 
dismissal of the “unexhausted” claim by the habeas court based on a conclu-
sion that dismissal of the Rule 2-4 petition as untimely, rather than mooted 
by Rule 1-2(h), constituted procedural default of the federal claim. A clear 
statement from the supreme court supporting application of Rule 1-2(h) to 
explain the petitioner’s correct exhaustion of state remedies, arguably pro-
tecting the right to proceed in federal court without first petitioning for re-
view. Without such a statement, the habeas court would likely find that it is 
required to defer to the state court dismissal on untimeliness grounds and 
conclude that this claim is procedurally defaulted. The “default” applied by 
the state court would bar review on the merits of the claim by the federal 
habeas court.374 
Dismissal by the state supreme court for procedural default, however, 
would contradict the clear intent its own Rule 1-2(h), in holding that such 
claims would be treated as exhausted and would seem unlikely. But, in any 
event, the delay in reaching a proper result recognizing the continuing via-
bility of the rule could readily be avoided with the timely filing for review 
pursuant to Rule 2-4. In the event this issue were to reach the supreme court 
while a federal petition is being held in abeyance to permit exhaustion, the 
court could extricate itself from further procedural skirmishes by issuing an 
opinion including a statement affirming the court’s adherence to Rule 1-2(h) 
and its underlying policy, such as the South Carolina Supreme Court did in 
State v. McKennedy.375 Whether such affirmation would bind the federal 
 
 373. See, e.g., Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005); see also supra notes 272–73 and 
accompanying text. 
 374. See, e.g., Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 
752–53 (1991); see also discussion of cases cited supra note 259. 
 375. 348 559 S.E.2d 850, 852 (S.C. 2002); see case cited and accompanying text supra 
note 345. 
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habeas courts in light of the holding in Gonzales v. Thaler,376 effectively 
denying reliance on the ninety day filing period for petitioning the Court for 
review by certiorari when the federal habeas petition failed to exhaust state 
discretionary review proceedings, would be questionable. It is a question 
that only the Supreme Court of the United States could answer authoritative-
ly. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Nothing in the Barnes footnote explains why the Arkansas Supreme 
Court found it necessary to redirect primary appellate jurisdiction in Rule 
37.1 appeals that included ineffective assistance of counsel claims from the 
court to the Arkansas Court of Appeals, nor did the court offer clarification 
of its newly-announced approach through a formal rule that would address 
questions not answered with respect to the scope of its order by footnote, 
even though the court has usually followed this approach,377 often after so-
liciting public and professional comment on the proposed change in a 
rule.378 
The unresolved questions raised by the court’s action in redirecting ap-
pellate jurisdiction in Rule 37.1 cases in which counsel’s effectiveness has 
been challenged, a claim urging a Sixth Amendment violation that might 
ultimately be resolved in the Supreme Court of the United States or federal 
habeas courts, will likely be resolved over time. The resolution of the issues 
not addressed by formal order that will eventually be decided by judicial 
decisions, necessarily means that litigants and practitioners will have less 
direction from the Arkansas Supreme Court than would be preferred in light 
of the complexity of state and federal postconviction processes.379 
 
 376. See supra note 364. In Gonzales v. Thaler, the Court already abrogated the Eighth 
Circuit Court holding that extended the one-year period for petitioning for federal habeas 
review by the period of time during which the state appellate court mandate had not issued. 
565 U.S. 134, 152–53 (2012), abrogating, Riddle v. Kemna, 523 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 2008). 
The Court held that the extended period of time was limited to the time for petitioning for 
review, avoiding the administrative difficulties caused by referencing differing state proce-
dures in the issuance of the mandate. Id. 
 377. E.g., ARK. SUP. CT. ADMIN. ORD. No. 21 §§ 3 (2011), https://www.arcourts.gov/
print/198283 (imposing requirements for electronic filing of pleadings and briefs in state 
courts); see Administrative Order, ARK. JUDICIARY, www.arcourts.gov/rules-and-
administrative-orders/administrative-orders (last visited Oct. 22, 2018). 
 378. See, e.g., In re Changes to Ark. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 294 Ark. 674, 674–75, 
742 S.W.2d 949, 949 (1988) (per curiam) (“The Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure 
has submitted to us proposed changes in the rules of criminal procedure . . . . We invite com-
ment upon the following changes, which will become effective on March 1, 1988 unless 
altered or withdrawn by per curiam order prior to that date.”) (emphasis added). 
 379. At this point, there is apparently no decision rendered by the Arkansas Supreme 
Court on a petition for review following a decision by the Arkansas Court of Appeals in an 
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What is clear is that the directive in the Barnes footnote has been im-
plemented to provide for initial appellate review of Rule 37 appeals not in-
volving cases in which a death sentence or sentence of life imprisonment 
has been imposed by the Arkansas Court of Appeals.380 What has not been 
made clear is whether the petition for review will remain an integral and 
necessary part of the Rule 37 appellate process, a critical issue with respect 
to exhaustion of state remedies to permit review of federal constitutional 
claims by the Supreme Court or federal habeas courts. 
The Arkansas Supreme Court could, of course, decide to expedite the 
process of informing petitioners and their attorneys, if represented by coun-
sel, of the necessity for petitioning for review by Arkansas Supreme Court 
Rule 2-4, of the viability of Supreme Court Rule 1-2(h), for instance, among 
other unresolved questions noted in this article. Or, the court might simply 
leave the questions to be addressed or answered on a case-by-case approach. 
 
appeal from denial of Rule 37.1 relief by a state circuit court. In two recent decisions, for 
instance, the supreme court ruled in Rule 37.1 appeals, but neither involved review of claims 
that had been rejected by the court of appeals in a direct appeal from denial of relief by the 
trial court. See Hinton v. State, 2019 Ark. 136, at 5, 2019 WL 1948729, at *2 (upholding 
denial of relief on ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim); Reynolds v. State, 2019 Ark. 
144, at 1, 2019 WL 2051786, at *1 (remanding for completion of the record). Hinton and 
Reynolds were decided by the Arkansas Supreme Court in appeals arising from 37.1 proceed-
ings in which the supreme court had decided the direct appeal in the case. Hinton, 2017 Ark. 
107, 515 S.W.3d 121; Reynolds, 2016 Ark. 214, 492 S.W.3d 491. See ARK. SUP. CT. R. 1-
2(a)(7) (providing that the supreme court has jurisdiction over “[s]econd or subsequent ap-
peals following an appeal which has been decided in the Supreme Court.”). 
 380. See, e.g., Vaughn v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 241, 519 S.W.3d 717 (decided April 17, 
2017, some six weeks after the Barnes court changed the appellate jurisdiction of Rule 37 
appeals effective March 2, 2017). 
